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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
Economists have long understood that innovations are at the root of modern economic growth, and 
many studies have been devoted to various aspects of the subject. Nevertheless, the rapid scientific 
and technological breakthroughs observed almost in all industries (biotechnological innovations in 
agriculture, for example) and the legal and institutional changes favoring stronger intellectual 
property rights in the last decades, provide new opportunities and challenges for research in this area. 
This thesis comprises three essays which identify and address specific problems at critical stages of 
the innovation process. 
Innovations are typically the result of some knowledge production and research processes, the 
output of which are public goods and are subject to market failure problems (Arrow, 1962). 
Regardless of how costly it is to come up with an invention, its reproduction often can be very easy 
and at low cost. As society benefit due to the non-exclusive nature of knowledge, inventors may not 
recoup the investment in their discovery activities. Secondly, uncertainty is part of the research 
process. These features justify the existence of intellectual property rights and government 
involvement in research activities in order to stimulate inventions. 
Innovations can be protected by intellectual property rights (IPRs) in market economies, 
which are typically patents, trade secrets, copyrights, and trademarks. The strongest form of 
protection is patents, which offer monopoly rights for a limited time in return for the full disclosure of 
innovations. Although other forms of IPRs are used in areas not covered by patents, trade secrets 
apply to the patentable innovations as well. By opting out for trade secrets, inventors forego the 
disclosure requirement necessary under patents but are provided limited protection. Alternative 
mechanisms to induce innovations, such as prizes, rewards, and procurement contracts, may not be 
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efficient in practice due to the informational asymmetry on the side of government. Therefore, patents 
provide a second best solution to information problems. As patents aim to promote the flow of 
innovations, they can create their own problems. The monopoly positions they provide limit the social 
optimal use of innovations. Moreover the competition for the rent position that patents promise can 
create inefficiencies.1 In a race to patent a given invention, which is typically modeled as a winner-
takes-all contest, in equilibrium firms may end up providing an inefficient amount of R&D (invest too 
much) but may also provide the wrong "type" of R&D. Specifically, projects that are chosen may be 
excessively risky and excessively correlated compared to the social optimum. The first essay (Chapter 
2) revisits the problem of correlation choices in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) by taking into account 
the fact that firms have the option of trade secrecy in addition to patents in protecting their inventions. 
We find that the availability of multiple IPR protection instruments can move the paths chosen by 
firms engaged in a winner-takes-all race towards the social optimum. 
In stimulating the inventions, government agencies can be directly involved by carrying out 
research in public institutions or funding research projects in universities, especially those in basic 
science, which are more likely to suffer from market failure problem and uncertainty, and therefore 
less likely to be undertaken by private firms. In fact, this is what happened in the United States in the 
last century and the output of publicly funded research was put in the public domain and established 
an "open science" environment, which is in line with the cultural norms of universities. Such a system 
received important credit in scientific breakthroughs. 
Nevertheless, based on an argument which presumes that without exclusive licenses private 
firms do not have enough incentives to develop "embryonic" university inventions, the Bayh-Dole 
Act of 1980 made it possible for universities and other non-profit organizations to retain title to 
patents derived from federally funded research, and therefore to license the inventions to private 
firms, possibly on an exclusive basis. Since the Act, there has been a dramatic surge in patenting and 
1 See Langinier and Moschini (2002) for a recent review of the literature. 
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licensing activities by U.S. universities. This growth in university patenting and licensing activities 
has resulted in a considerable debate in the literature, which has revolved around how these activities 
have affected the traditional role of universities (advancement of science and dissemination of 
knowledge), how they impacted the other channels (publications, conferences and others) through 
which the universities transfer knowledge, and whether the Bayh-Dole Act was in fact necessary to 
promote technology transfer. 
The third essay (Chapter 4) aims to contribute to this discussion by studying the basic, yet 
somewhat unexplored, question of whether in fact universities in expectation, are earning economic 
rent (profits) from licensing activities. We mostly utilize the data from AUTM (Association of the 
University Technology Managers) surveys on various licensing activities of U.S. universities and 
some university characteristics, and other sources. The data include 148 observations from U.S. 
universities and cover the five years time period 1998 to 2002. We estimate a structural econometric 
model and identify the key determinant of license rent generation as the quality of faculty (which is 
measured by the citations received in technology departments), together with the size of the university 
in terms of total research expenditures. 
After innovations have taken place, and possibly receive some form of IPR protection, the 
diffusion and adoption processes begin. Once introduced in the market, inventions can create 
distributional economic effects across economic agents as they may replace or provide alternatives to 
existing products. The second essay (Chapter 3) studies an application in this context: Genetically 
Modified (GM) crops, which are based on IPR-protected innovations that consist of the insertion of 
foreign genetic material into traditional crops to obtain desired attributes, such as herbicide and pest 
resistance. Although GM crops have been quickly adopted in certain parts of the world, they have met 
with resistance from consumers in the European Union (EU) market. This has resulted in a complex 
(and ongoing) EU regulation, which envisions the co-existence of GM food with conventional and 
quality-enhanced products. As the regulation mandates the labeling and traceability of GM content at 
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all stages of production, and allows only a stringent adventitious presence of GM content in other 
products, it implies significant economic costs. Based on a partial equilibrium modeling of the EU 
agricultural food sector, we analyze the economic implications of the introduction of GM food in the 
EU market. We develop and calibrate a model to replicate the EU agricultural data in 2000. We find 
in the baseline solution of our model that the introduction of GM food is reducing overall welfare 
(both consumers and producers become worse off), but the producers of quality-enhanced products 
may become better off. We also solve the model for alternative scenarios and do sensitivity analysis 
to key parameters of the model. 
2. Thesis Organization: 
The three essays briefly described in the preceding section are self-contained with their own 
Introduction, Conclusion and References sections. Following these essays is the General Conclusion 
section. 
3. References (for General Introduction) 
Arrow, K.J. 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions." In The 
Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors. Edited by R.R. 
Nelson. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Dasgupta, P., and E. Maskin. 1987. "The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios." Economic 
Journal 97: 581-95. 
Langinier, C., and G. Moschini. 2002. "The Economics of Patents: An Overview." In Intellectual 
Property Rights in Animal Breeding and Genetics. Edited by M. F. Rothschild and S. 
Newman. New York, NY, CABI Publishing. 
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CHAPTER 2. PATENTS, TRADE SECRETS AND THE CORRELATION AMONG R&D 
PROJECTS1 
Abstract 
The choice of a research path in attacking scientific and technological problems is a significant 
component of firms' R&D strategy. One of the findings of the patent races literature is that, in a 
competitive market setting, firms' noncooperative choices of research projects display an excessive 
degree of correlation, as compared to the socially optimal level. The paper revisits this question in a 
context where firms have access to trade secrets, in addition to patents, to assert intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) over their discoveries. We find that the availability of multiple IPR protection 
instruments can move the paths chosen by firms engaged in a R&D race towards the social optimum. 
1. Introduction 
By endowing inventors with exclusive property rights over their discoveries, patents can be a 
powerful incentive for undertaking new research and development (R&D) projects in a market 
economy, thereby promoting the flow of innovation that is at the root of modern economic growth. 
Ancillary benefits that are often cited include the patent system's role in disseminating new 
knowledge and in helping technology transfer and commercialization of new inventions. But patents 
are a quintessential second-best solution to very real market failures that affect the provision of 
1 This is a joint paper with GianCarlo Moschini. 
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innovations in a competitive setting. Whereas they solve some incentive problems, the monopoly 
positions engineered by patent rights can create other inefficiencies (see Scotchmer (2004) or 
Langinier and Moschini (2002) for an overview). The economic issues raised by patent races are a 
case in point. The competition for the economic rents secured by a patent provides incentive for 
parallel research (Dasgupta, 1990). Given that R&D projects have uncertain outcomes, some parallel 
research may be desirable from the social point of view because it increases the probability of 
success. But because the reward to firms engaged in a patent race is in the form of winner takes all, 
too much parallel research is also possible in a competitive setting, an example of the rent dissipation 
postulate (Tirole, 1988). 
In addition to providing a possibly inefficient amount of R&D investment, parallel research 
also may fail to provide the correct type of R&D efforts. Specifically, competitors in a patent race 
may choose strategies that are too risky from society's viewpoint (Klette and de Meza, 1986). More 
subtly, R&D competitors may choose projects that are excessively correlated relative to what is 
socially desirable. Expanding on earlier work by Bhattacharya and Mookheijee (1986), Dasgupta and 
Maskin (1987) showed that projects selected by firms engaged in a patent race are in fact excessively 
correlated. Cabrai (1994) showed that the excess risk result is sensitive to the specification of the 
winner-takes-all assumption, and a model allowing for post-R&D oligopoly market sharing may 
actually induce the opposite bias (too little risk-taking in R&D). However, excess correlation of R&D 
still obtains in his model. Cabrai (2002) studied the strategic choice of covariance in a dynamic R&D 
model and showed that, in equilibrium, laggards may want to diversify from leaders, thereby 
choosing less promising paths. 
In this paper we revisit the issue of excessive correlation in a parallel research setting by 
investigating the impact of a more realistic institutional setting. Specifically, it is known that firms 
rely on multiple modes of protection for their discoveries. Trade secrets, lead time, and 
manufacturing capabilities not only complement patents in helping firms appropriate returns from 
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R&D activities but are often considered more important (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000). Indeed, 
the reported importance of trade secrecy increased dramatically compared to earlier industry surveys 
(Arundel, 2001). Trade secrets are particularly attractive to inventors when a discovery is difficult and 
costly to reverse engineer and/or discover independently (Daizadeh et al., 2002). In agricultural 
innovations, for example, this has been the case for proprietary germplasm. Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International successfully used trade secrets to protect its germplasm in at least two high-profile cases 
(against Holden Foundation Seeds, Inc. in 1991, for a judgment worth $46.7 million, and against 
Cargill, Inc. in 2000, for a settlement worth $100 million). More generally, Lerner (1995) finds that 
trade secret disputes captured 43 % of intellectual property litigations. 
The impact of alternative modes of intellectual property protection has been the object of a 
number of studies. In line with the strategic patenting hypothesis discussed in the empirical literature, 
Horstmann, MacDonald and Slivinski (1985) consider the relative advantage of the explicit choice 
not to patent. In a signaling model, Scotchmer and Green (1990) consider not patenting as alternative 
to patenting intermediate discoveries in a multi stage innovation race. Anton and Yao (2004) study 
the choice between patenting and trade secrets to process innovation in a Cournot competition setting. 
Denicolo and Franzoni (2004) explicitly model multiple modes of protection available to innovators 
in studying the ability of patents to exclude prior users. Note that these studies have focused on the 
choice of research intensity. However, the choice of research paths in attacking scientific and 
technological problems is a significant component of firms' R&D strategy (Cabrai, 2003). 
Does the availability of alternative modes of protection impact the research paths chosen by 
R&D competitors? That is essentially the question that we propose to analyze in this paper, and we 
do so by developing a simple model that combines features of Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) and 
Denicolo and Franzoni (2004) analyses. In particular, we model the strategic interaction between 
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firms both at the stage of project selection and at the stage of intellectual property (IP) choice.2 By 
linking research and IP game stages, we are able to analyze how the availability of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) protection instruments affects some relevant research choices in a parallel R&D 
contest. We find that the availability of additional modes of protection (trade secrets in our model) 
may in fact lead R&D competitors to choose less correlated projects. The root of our finding is that 
the presence of an additional IPR instrument introduces an asymmetry on how firms are rewarded in 
the event of success. Specifically, when there is a single winner in the R&D contest, the availability 
of trade secrets (in addition to patents) means that the firm has the option of selecting a possibly more 
profitable IPR protection. But when both firms are successful, the strategic game between firms 
makes the additional IPR protection instruments less useful. Thus, the presence of trade secrets in 
addition to patents provides an additional incentive to be the sole winner, thereby driving firms' R&D 
choices closer to the social optimum for a range of parameter values. We conclude that modeling 
parallel research with just one winner-takes-all instrument (i.e., patents) may exaggerate the concerns 
about the insufficient diversification of privately chosen research portfolios. Our model is also useful 
in recovering a role for patent length as a policy tool in this context, shedding perhaps a novel light on 
the interaction among alternative IPR protection modes. 
2. The Modeling Framework 
The starting point of our model is the two-point distribution approach introduced in Dasgupta 
and Maskin (1987). The R&D contest is represented as a one-shot game in which two firms (firm 1 
2 The competition in the research stage is often suppressed in the literature studying strategic 
patenting, where it is usually assumed that one of the firms is the winner of the research contest, and a 
leader-follower situation arises at the patenting stage (e.g., Horstmann, MacDonald and Slivinski 
1985; Denicolo and Franzoni 2004; and Bessen 2004). On the other hand, studies focusing on the 
research stage competition typically do not model the strategic interaction in the choices concerning 
intellectual property protection (e.g., Dasgupta and Maskin 1987). 
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and firm 2) simultaneously pursue a research project, the outcome of which is either "success" 
(denoted with 5) or "failure" (denoted with F ). Let Xi e [S, F] denote the random outcome for the 
ith firm (z =1,2 ), such that four events (Xx,X2) are possible: (S ,S) ,  (S ,F) ,  (F ,S) , and (F ,F) .  
Let Pi and p denote the i'h firm's unconditional probability of success, and the coefficient of 
correlation of the dichotomous variables Xt (e.g., Hays and Winkler, 1970, pp. 206-208), 
respectively. The probabilities of the four possible events are as follows: 
prob(S ,S)  = p l p 2 +Cov(X l ,X 2 ) ,  (l.a) 
prob (S ,F)  = p l ( l -p 2 )~  Cov(Xt ,X 2 ) ,  (l.b) 
prob(F,S)  = ( \ -p l )p 2  -Cov(X l ,X 2 ) ,  (l.c) 
prob (F ,F)  = ( \ -  p {  )(1 -p 2 )  + Cov(Xj ,X 2 ) ,  (l.d) 
where Cov(Xj ,X 2 )  =  P^P\( \ -  P\ )P 2 (} -  P 2 )  is the covariance term. 
As in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987), in this setting the presumption is that a firm can 
unilaterally diversify from its rival (thereby reducing the correlation of outcomes) at the expense of 
decreasing its own unconditional probability of success. Thus, we assume that each firm can choose a 
leve l  o f  d ivers i f ica t ion  ef for t  a {  e  [0 ,1]  tha t  a f fec ts  bo th  the  uncondi t iona l  probabi l i ty  o f  success  p;  
as well as the correlation/covariance of outcomes, where a, = 0 represents no diversification effort 
of firm / and a, = 1 represents firm's i maximum diversification.3 Specifically, we write 
p(ai)- Pj, i-1,2, and C(ax,a2) - Cov(Xl,X2).4 In the analysis that follows we rely on the 
following: 
3 Note that our specification differs slightly from that adopted by Dasgupta and Maskin (1987). In 
particular, they consider the project space to be [1/2, l] for firm 1 and [0,1/2] for firm 2. Also, 
their parameterization of the covariance structure differs from the canonical form given above. 
4 Because the success probability function p(- )  is the same for both firms, the covariance function is 
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Assumption 1. (i) The unconditional probability function p(a { )  is strictly decreasing and strictly 
concave in its domain, with maximum at at - 0 and minimum at at = 1. (ii) The covariance 
function C(aua2) is strictly decreasing in a;- ( z = 1,2). (iii) The probability of event (F,F), that 
is [l - />(a, )] [l - p(a2 )] + C(a,, a2 ), is strictly convex in a( ( z = 1,2) . 
As in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987), it may also be desirable to restrict attention to the case of 
nonnegative covariance, such that maximum diversification choices entail C(l, 1) = 0. 
2.1. Social Optimum 
In this setting, the question of interest concerns what the noncooperative choices of the two 
firms are, and how that compares with the desirable choices from society's viewpoint. To address that 
in the simplest case, following Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) we assume that the payoff to society of 
at least one project being successful is B > 0, and we abstract from cost considerations. Thus, 
expected social welfare can be written as B • [l - prob(F, F)] so that the social planner's problem is: 
Max B • [l - prob{F, F)] (2) 
a\>a2 
Therefore, the social planner maximizes the total probability of success. The objective function in 
equation (2) is strictly concave by Assumption 1, and thus we have a unique solution to the welfare 
maximization problem. 
Given our formulation, the solution to the problem in (2) is symmetric and it is labeled 
(a*,a*) . Note that, because prob(F,F) = 1 - prob(S,F) -p(a2) = 1 -probiF,S) -p(ax), from 
equations (1) the optimality conditions for an interior solution are equivalent to 
symmetric in project choices, that is C{a x ,a 2 )  =  C(a 2 ,a x ) , V (a,,a2)e[0,1]x[0,1]. See Appendix 
A.l for more details and implications of Assumption 1. 
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dprob(S,F) _ dp(ax) [l-p(o2)]-^y:)=0 , (3.a) 
dax  dax  do, 
dprob^S) = Main - Ma,)] - aC(g"°2) = 0 . (3.b) 
da2 da2 da2 
That is, the social planner effectively maximizes the probabilities that each firm is the single winner. 
In doing this, it weighs the loss of the unconditional probability of success against the (optimal) 
diversification gain through the covariance term. 
2.2. Noncooperative solution 
By contrast, in a competitive R&D setting, firms simultaneously choose research projects in a 
non-cooperative fashion. Let Uss denote the expected payoff to each firm when both firms are 
successful, let Us denote the payoff to a single successful firm, and let UF be the payoff to the 
firm that fails (whether alone or jointly with the other firm). It is assumed that 
Us > 2Uss > UF - 0 .5 Then, the firms' optimization problems (conditional on the other firm choice) 
are: 
Max V x (a x ,a 2 )  =  U s s -prob(S ,S)  + U s -prob(S ,F) ,  (4.1) 
a x  
Max V 2 (a x ,a 2 )  =  U s s  •  p rob(S ,S)  +  U s  •  p rob(F,S) , (4.2) 
a 2  
with first order conditions (FOCs) for an interior solution: 
eprob(S,S) aprons,!?)^ _ (5.,) 
dax  dax  
5 The condition Uss > 0 presumes that competition between successful innovators does not dissipate 
the rent created by the innovation, an outcome that is likely under a variety of market conditions 
(Cabrai, 1994). The condition Us > 2Uss simply means that a monopoly is at least as profitable as a 
duopoly. 
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dprob{S,S) Sprob(F,S)= 0 _ ( 5 . 2 )  
da2 da2 
which yield the firms' best response functions. Note that, because by Assumption (1) prob(F,F)  is 
convex in (aua2) and p(at) is concave, then prob(F,S) and prob(S,F) are concave in 
{ax,a2) (see Appendix A. 1.2). Furthermore, in view of (1), the firms' objective functions can 
alternatively be written as Vx(a,,a2) = Uss • p(ax) + (Us -Uss)-prob(S,F) and 
V2(ax,a2) = Uss • p(a2) + {Us -Uss) • prob(F,S), and therefore they are concave in the decision 
variables. Hence, the FOCs in (5) are both necessary and sufficient for a maximum. The (symmetric) 
competitive market portfolio—the Nash equilibrium, denoted with (ac,ac) —satisfies the best 
response functions of both firms, i.e., it solves equations (5). We shall further restrict our analysis as 
follows. 
Assumption 2. The problems in (2) and (4) admit solutions that lie in the interior of [0, l] x [0, l] .6 
The following result (Proposition 3 in Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987) then follows. 
Proposition 1. The noncooperative solution consists of projects that are too highly correlated, 
re la t ive  to  the  soc ia l  op t imum.  That  i s ,  a c  < a*.  
Proof. By assumption Uss > 0 and, given Assumption 1, dprob(S ,S) /da i  < 0,  i  = 1,2 . Hence, if 
equations (3) hold, equations (5) cannot hold. Specifically, the FOCs for the social optimum, when 
evaluated at the noncooperative equilibrium solution, are positive. Because the second order 
See Appendix A.2 on sufficient conditions for interior solutions. 
13 
sufficient conditions (SOSCs) for the planner's problem hold globally, the result of Proposition 1 
follows.» 
The intuition for this result is as follows. Whereas society does not care about the identity of 
the winner (i.e., society is indifferent between the outcomes (S, S), (S, F) and (F,S) ), the firms of 
course do care. If, starting from the market equilibrium, a firm were to move away from the rival, 
towards the social optimum, it would create a positive externality for the opponent because it 
increases the probability that the opponent is successful when the firm in question is not. Although 
that is desirable for society because it increases the total probability of success, this effect is not taken 
into account in the firms' problem. 
2.3. Comparative Statics 
To extend the analysis of Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) with the aim of considering multiple modes of 
protection, we first note that the competitive (Nash equilibrium) solution depends on the relative 
magnitude of the payoffs Uss and Us. More specifically, the following preliminary result will be 
useful in what follows. 
Lemma 1. The symmetric Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative (interior) solution, (ac,ac) is such 
that. ac is increasing in Us (the payoff to a single successful firm) and it is decreasing in Uss (the 
payoff when both firms are successful). Furthermore, if R = Uss/Us, then ac is decreasing in R. 
Proof. Let <f>t (at ,a 2 ;U s ,  U s s  ) - 0  denote the FOC in equations (5) ( i = 1,2 ), such that the symmetric 
Nash equilibrium is the solution to ^(ac,ac;Us,Uss) = 0. From standard comparative statics one 
can then establish that sign(dacjdUs^ = sign(d^/dUs) and sign(dac/dUss) = sign(d^>i/dUss), as 
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shown in the Appendix A.3.2. Furthermore, d^/dU s s  = dprob(S ,S) /da i \  a C  a  =a<. <0 and 
5^/d[/s = dprob{S,F)/dal\(a =q„ q =q,. > 0. The first inequality follows directly from Assumption 1, 
and the second inequality follows from the fact that equation (5) holds. Similarly, 
sign{dac/dR^j = signify/dR.) and d<j>ildR = dprob(S,S)ldai\^=a:, a =a^ <0. • 
The important implication here is that anything that increases the payoffs in the event of a 
single successful firm without changing the payoff in the event of both firms succeeding will tend to 
decrease the correlation of the firms' equilibrium choices. Similarly, decreasing the payoff when both 
firms succeed, while keeping the payoffs in other events constant, decreases the correlation of choices 
as well. This will be the basis for proving our main conclusion—that having different modes of IPR 
protection may lead to a more desirable outcome vis-à-vis the differentiation of firms' research 
projects. 
3. The Model with Patents and Trade Secrets 
To add an explicit consideration of alternative modes of protection, we continue to assume 
that research outcomes are common knowledge. The game tree for this case is depicted in Figure 1. 
Note that this extends the one-shot game discussed earlier by the addition of an intellectual property 
(IP) subgame. What were exogenous payoffs in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) are made a function of 
IP choices along the lines of Denicolo and Franzoni (2004). Specifically, the winner of the research 
stage chooses between a patent and trade secret protection. The patent provides T < oo periods of 
absolute monopoly. If we were to interpret the social payoff B as the present value of a perpetual 
flow of benefits, then B - \^be~rtdt -~r, where b is the per-period benefit and r is the discount 
rate. We assume, for simplicity, that the patentee can capture the entire social surplus while the 
patent is valid, a patent lasting T periods provides a return of fye^dt . The reward from the 
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patent protection can therefore be written as S(T)B , where 
a(r)=(i-g-T) (6) 
denotes the fraction of total social surplus captured by the patentee.7 We write 5{T)  to emphasize 
tha t  the  reward  of fered  by  pa ten ts  depends  on  a  pol icy  var iab le ,  the  pa ten t  length  T .  
The protection offered by trade secrets, rooted in civil law, can provide an alternative way to 
secure a temporary monopoly. Unlike the case of patents, the monopoly is of random duration and 
ends whenever other firms independently invent or reverse engineer the invention, i.e., when the 
secret leaks out (Friedman, Landes and Posner 1991). Assuming an exponential distribution for the 
duration of the trade secret, the payoff in this case can be written as \^be'(z+r^dt, where the hazard 
rate z indexes the difficulty of concealing the invention (that is, e~zt is the probability that the 
secret will not leak out by time t ). Thus, the reward from trade secret protection can be written as 
y(z)B , where 
represents the fraction of total social surplus that can be captured under trade secrecy protection. We 
write y(z) to emphasize that the strength of protection offered by trade secrets depends on the 
hazard rate z > 0 . Furthermore, the value of trade secrets as an IPR protection instrument depends 
on the provisions established by law (mostly state law in the United States). Thus, in this setting the 
7 We assume that the social and private discount rates are identical, but this condition could easily be 
relaxed. 
8 As in Denicolo and Franzoni (2004), the parameter r  could also account for the arrival rate of an 
alternative discovery that supersedes the technology. Under this interpretation, one may expect r to 
be higher under the patent choice than under secrecy, because the information disclosure required by 
patents may be useful in the research for a superior innovation. Here we abstract from such 
generalizations. 
**>-7Î7 (7) 
parameter z  also can be considered a policy instrument. 
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The loser of the R&D race gets zero payoff from its research activity. Furthermore, without 
loss of generality, in what follows we normalize the social benefit of success to 5 = 1. 
3.1. Equilibria in the IP Subgame 
To find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the game depicted in Figure 1, we 
begin with the subgames that start when R&D outcomes become known. Once the equilibrium 
payoffs from the IP subgames are determined, the game reduces to the one in Dasgupta and Maskin 
(1987) discussed earlier. For three of the possible four outcomes the situation is trivial. For the event 
(F,F), where both firms fail to innovate, the game ends with both firms obtaining a zero payoff. For 
the events (S,F) and (F,S), on the other hand, only one firm succeeds. The successful firm obtains 
a payoff 8(T) with patenting and a payoff y(z) with trade secrecy, and thus the IP choice revolves 
around max{y(z), <5(7)}. The unsuccessful firm gets zero payoff. 
For event (S ,  S )  , when both firms are successful with the invention, we have a simultaneous-
move game for the firms' choice of IP protection mode. We assume that, if both firms try to patent, 
each firm has an equal chance of getting priority. If both choose trade secret protection, they will 
engage in a duopoly competition as long as the secret does not leak out.9 If one of the firms decides 
to keep secret, it can of course be excluded whenever the other inventor decides to patent (the 
patenting firm would get the full reward). The payoff matrix in Table 1 summarizes the firms' LP 
subgame, where the parameter ju e (0,1) captures the profit dissipation due to the competition that 
arises when both firms elect to use trade secrets (e.g., the joint profit of duopolists is lower than that 
of a monopolist). 
9 We are implicitly assuming that the probability distribution of the trade secret duration does not 
depend on the number of secret holders. 
17 
Note that if <5(7) > ~y(z) , the profile (Patent, Patent) is the unique Nash equilibrium. In 
particular, if juy(z )<ô(T ) , this equilibrium is Pareto efficient. If y y(z) < <5(7) < juy(z )  , the IP 
game is of the prisoner's dilemma type and the unique Nash equilibrium (Patent, Patent) yields a 
lower payoff (to both firms) than the profile (Secret, Secret). If S(T)  < y  y(z ) , on the other hand, we 
have a coordination game that admits two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, i.e., the profiles in which 
both firms patent and that in which both firms choose the trade secret. In this case, we also have a 
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Specifically, whenever ô(T)  < y  y(z ) , the (symmetric) non-
degenerate mixed strategy equilibrium is defined by a = \_S(T) / ( juy(z ) - <?(7))] for both players, 
where a* denotes the probability assigned to the pure strategy "Secret" (such that 1-cr* is the 
probability assigned to the pure strategy "Patent").10 We can summarize the foregoing analysis in the 
following: 
Lemma 2. In the IP subgame that follows the event (S, S) ,(i) For S(T) > juy(z) there is a unique 
Nash equilibrium where both firms patent, and this equilibrium is Pareto efficient, (ii) For 
Hy(z) > S(T) > yU/(z)/2 there is a unique Nash equilibrium where both firms patent, and this 
equilibrium is of the prisoner's dilemma type, (iii) For /z/(z)/2 > S(T) there are two pure strategy 
equilibria—(Patent, Patent) and (Secret, Secret)—and a mixed strategy equilibria.. 
Table 2 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes of the IP subgame. Note that, as fi decreases 
towards 0 (that is, the market competition between firms when both hold the trade secret dissipates 
profits more and more), the range of parameter where (Patent, Patent) is the unique Nash equilibrium 
10 The mixed strategy solution is somewhat unappealing in our context because it implies that, as the 
strategy profile where both firms patent become less and less attractive, in equilibrium each firm puts 
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increases (in particular, the range for UNE-1 increases and that for UNE-2 decreases). Furthermore, 
the range of parameters where multiple equilibria arise also shrinks. 
3.2. Impact on Firms' Research Paths 
By introducing alternative modes of protection, we have made otherwise exogenous payoffs a 
function of IP choices. Once the payoffs associated with the equilibria discussed in Lemma 2 are 
obtained, the reduced game has the same structure as the one in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987). We can 
then exploit the comparative statics analysis that we discussed in Lemma 1 to obtain comparisons of 
alternative IP environments. Specifically, we can conclude the following. 
Proposition 2. Whenever n e  (0,1) and S{T) < y(z), the availability of trade secret protection, in 
addition to patents, leads firms to select actions that decrease the correlation of R&D outcomes, as 
compared with the patent-only environment, although the correlation level still remains higher than 
the socially optimal level. 
Proof. The equilibrium payoffs of the IP subgame, under the patents-plus-trade-secret environment, 
are summarized in the last two columns of Table 2. By contrast recall that, in the patents-only 
environment, the expected payoff to the firms for the event (£,£) is UgS ~^8{T) and the payoff to 
the successful firm for events (S,F) and (F,S) is U$ = S(T). Hence, for the parameter range 
y(z) > S(T)> ny{z)/2, the availability of trade secret protection (in addition to patents) increases the 
winner's payoff for the events with only one successful firm while it leaves unchanged the payoff for 
the event when both firms succeed. By Lemma 1, therefore, the equilibrium correlation level must 
decline (i.e., the Nash equilibrium action ac increases). For the parameter range juy(z)/2> S(T) the 
more probability mass on the "Patent" strategy. 
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payoff associated with the event (S ,S)  depends on which particular equilibrium one considers. For 
the (Patent, Patent) equilibrium the outcome is exactly as for the y(z) > S(T) > fiy{z)/2 parameter 
range. For the (Secret, Secret) equilibrium, the equilibrium payoffs under patent-plus-trade-secret 
environment is U^s = ~y(z) for event (S,S) and U$+s = y(z) for the events with a single 
successful firm. Then, {u^s jlJ$+s ) = y < (t/jy fas)- \ because /u e (0,1), and hence the results 
of Lemma 1 apply to this domain as well. Finally, the mixed-strategy equilibrium payoff under event 
(S,S) cannot exceed that of the equilibrium (Secret, Secret), and therefore we again conclude that 
{UssS/Us+S) < (Uss/u$ ) • By Lemma 1, therefore, the equilibrium correlation level must decline.™ 
The equilibrium R&D choices of the firms, for the various regions of the parameter space that 
we discussed, are illustrated in Figure 2. Note that, whenever S(T) < y{z), (Patent, Patent) is a Nash 
equilibrium of the IP subgame. For this equilibrium the ratio Uj^s /U$+s is monotonically 
increasing in S(T), and so the equilibrium competitive action for this environment, labeled acP+s, is 
decreasing (i.e., R&D projects are more and more correlated). For the subset 
(juy(z)/2) < S(T) < y(z) of this parameter range, the profile (Patent, Patent) is actually the unique 
Nash equilibrium, and the associated graph of acP+s is represented by the green segment in Figure 2. 
When S(T) = y{z) the payoff ratio reaches its maximum value of j ; this is the same as the patent-
only environment, and thus ap+s - acP for 5(T)  > y(z ) .  For the domain S(T)  < fuy(z ) /2  we have 
two Nash equilibria in pure strategies. If the firms could coordinate on the (Secret, Secret) 
equilibrium, the payoff ratio would be /u$+s ) - -f < y > leading to the equilibrium outcome 
that equal the value of the solution in an hypothetical trade-secret-only environment, labeled acs in 
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Figure 2. Note that the trade-secret-only environment would lead to an equilibrium correlation level 
that is lower than the patent-only environment. In fact, it is even lower than the equilibrium 
correlation level under the patent-plus-secrecy environment whenever S(T) > juy(z). For the 
parameter range S(T)  < juy{z) /2  we also have a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium 
outcome of which are depicted by the red segment. 
We should stress that the main point of Proposition 2 does not rely on the assumption that 
ju< 1. Indeed, were one to make the (questionable) assumption that n = l, the parameter range 
(y (z ) /2) < 5{T)  < y(z )  would still support our conclusion (see Figure 2). We can also note that the 
parameter space associated with a unique equilibrium in the IP subgame could be extended by 
appealing to notions that select among pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Particularly attractive, in our 
case, is the notion of risk-dominant equilibrium (RDE) introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). In 
our 2x2 symmetric game, if both players strictly prefer the same action when each assumes that the 
opponent randomizes evenly between the two available actions, then the profile in which they play 
that action is the risk-dominant equilibrium. (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).11 It follows that, if 
j y (z )  < S(T)  < jy (z ) , then the profile (Patent, Patent) is the (unique) RDE, thereby extending the 
parameter range where the competitively chosen diversification efforts are decreasing in y(z )  (i.e., 
the green segment in Figure 2). Conversely, if S(T)  <jy(z )  the RDE profile is (Secret, Secret) and, 
for the case S(T)  -  yy(z ), neither pure strategy equilibrium is dominating (which makes the mixed 
strategy equilibrium perhaps more meaningful at this point). Table 3 presents the equilibrium payoffs 
and Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium diversification efforts for different parameter space as RDE 
11 The basic idea is that, when a player does not know which equilibrium is selected by the other 
player, she will play the strategy of the less risky equilibrium. Risk-dominance as an equilibrium 
selection criterion in 2x2 games also is supported by the global games analysis of Carlsson and van 
Damme (1993), the results of which are extended to supermodular games by Frankel, Morris and 
Pauzner (2003). 
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notion is appealed in the relevant parameter range. 
An additional result that is worth emphasizing in this model concerns the ability of the social 
planner to affect firms' choices by altering the parameters T and z that index the strength of IPR 
protection. 
Proposition 3. In the patent-only environment the social planner cannot affect the firms ' R&D 
diversification choices by choosing the patent length T. In the patent-plus-trade-secret environment, 
on the other hand, the social planner may be able to induce firms to diversify towards social optimum 
by providing a relatively weaker protection to patents (or stronger protection for trade-secrets). 
Proof. The first part of the proposition follows directly from observing that, in the patent-only 
environment, the payoff ratio (u$s/u$ j = ^  is independent of patent length T . In the patent-plus-
secrecy environment, on the other hand, a°P+s monotonically increases as T decreases for the unique 
Nash  equi l ibr ium of  the  parameter  range  y(z )  >S(T)> / j .y{z ) /2  . •  
For a similar argument, the social planner cannot affect R&D correlation in the other polar 
case, the trade-secret-only environment, by choosing the strength of trade secret protection (as 
indexed by the leak parameter z ). Hence, in our setting, the strength of IPR protection can be an 
effective policy instrument, to affect the firms' equilibrium R&D correlation level, only if multiple 
protection instruments are available. Thus, our analysis provides another justification for the 
optimality of a finite patent length, distinct from the classic trade-off between dynamic incentive 
benefits and static efficiency losses analyzed by Nordhaus (1969) and others. 
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4. An Example 
The relationship between the equilibrium correlation levels, the different values of the leak 
parameter, and the behavior of the correlation level under different solution concepts as patent length 
varies can be illustrated with the following example. First, we parameterize the correlation coefficient 
as p = \ -~(a x  + a 2 )  • Thus, as in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) we consider the case of non-negative 
correlation only. Next, the unconditional probability functions are specified as af . 
Note that this implies p, (a t )  e [0,y] and, given our parameterization of correlation, the condition 
j9, (a, )e[0,y] is sufficient to ensure that the covariance term is decreasing in the actions ax and a2 
(see also Appendix A. 1.1). Thus, this parameterization satisfies the basic assumptions of our model. 
The resulting social planner's objective function, equation (2), is in fact concave for the domain of 
interest. To solve for the firms' noncooperative choices, we set r = 0.04 and, consistent with the 
assumed normalization B = 1, set b-r. Finally, we set pi = 8/9 (as would result, for example, from 
a textbook example of Coumot competition with linear demands). 
Having computed the optimal R&D choices, in Figure 3 we report the implied correlation 
coefficient p under various conditions regarding y(z) and 5(T). Specifically, here we fix the 
patent length as T = 20 years (as is the case in virtually all jurisdictions), so that the fraction of 
social surplus that is offered by patent protection is S(20) = 0.55 , and then consider various levels of 
the trade secret parameter y(z). The socially optimal correlation level for this example turns out to be 
p* = 0.48 . If IPR protection were available only through patents, the firms' noncooperative action 
choices results in pp = 0.76 . When trade secrets are available, in addition to patents, then we need to 
differentiate according to the parameter space. For values of z such that y(z)<5(20), trade secret 
pro tec t ion  i s  no t  e f fec t ive  and  the  cor re la t ion  leve l  i s  ca lcu la ted  as  p p + s  -  p p  -  0.76 .  When y(z )  
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exceeds <5(20), trade secret protection becomes relevant and the Nash equilibrium correlation level 
decreases, reaching a minimum of 0.63 (when y(z) = 1 ). For the range 5(20) < y(z) < 1 , the 
profile where both firms patent is actually the unique Nash equilibrium. In fact, given the chosen 
levels of the parameters, here it is always the case that Y y(z) < S(20), Vz G [0,oo) and V/ze (0,1), 
and thus the case of multiple equilibria for the IP subgame does not arise. This equilibrium is of the 
prisoner's dilemma type for y(z) > S(20)/ pi, that is for y(z) > 0.62 . Thus, the profit-dissipation 
parameter pi G (0,1) does not affect pp+s in Figure 3 but only the hypothetical correlation level that 
would attain in the trade-secret-only environment, say p s  and, from the foregoing, p s  = 0.73 < p p .  
5. Conclusion 
We have shown that the availability of multiple modes of protection—specifically trade 
secrets and patents—can affect the equilibrium outcome of competitively chosen diversification 
efforts in a parallel research contest. In particular, the availability of trade secrets in addition to 
patents can push the market outcome towards the social optimum as far as the choice of correlation 
among R&D projects is concerned. Therefore, considering a generic winner-takes-all contest (with 
an implicit single mode of protection) in studying the correlation level of firms' R&D activities may 
miss an important institutional feature and may overestimate the bias inherent in competitive parallel 
research contests. 
Another implication of the model that we have studied is that it is only when multiple modes 
of protection are present that the competitively chosen R&D diversification efforts can be affected by 
the patent length. In reality, of course, patent length is fixed by law and, following the 
implementation of the TRIPS agreement of the World Trade Organization, it is the same (20 years) 
for all signatory countries. But what matters here is the strength of IPR protection offered by patents 
relative to that of trade secrets, and the latter are quite a bit more variable because they are rooted in 
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civil law. Furthermore, the strength of trade secret protection may vary across technology fields 
because it depends crucially of the feasibility of reverse engineering (admissible under trade secret 
protection). Hence, in some fields at least, the availability of trade secret protection may be critical 
for the nature of competitively chosen R&D activities and may beneficially affect firms' R&D 
diversification efforts. 
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Table 1. Payoff matrix of IP protection subgame 
Firm 2 
Trade Secret Patent 
Trade Secret 0 , f(T) 
Patent , 0 
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Table 2. Parametric domain, equilibrium IP strategies and outcomes with both patents and 
trade secrets 
Parametric domain Event (S ,S )  : both firms are successful 
Events 
(S,F) or 
(F,X) 
Equilibrium 
profile(s) 
Type of 
equilibrium 
Equilibrium 
payoff(s) 
Winner's 
payoff 
f(n>r(z) (Patent, Patent) UNE-1 
r ( z )  >S(T)> f iy ( z )  (Patent, Patent) UNE-1 i»(T) 
juy (z )>S(T)> nr ( z ) l2  (Patent, Patent) UNE-2 \ s (T)  y(z )  
(Patent, Patent) 1 S(T)  
^(z)/2^^(n (Secret, Secret) MNE f rW r(z) 
(cr*,l — cr*) 2 
Notes: UNE-1 = Unique Nash equilibrium (Pareto efficient); 
UNE-2 = Unique Nash equilibrium (prisoner's dilemma); 
MNE = Multiple Nash equilibria, where the mixed strategy equilibrium is: 
Hy(z ) -ô (T)  
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Table 3. Parametric domain and equilibrium IP strategies and outcomes 
Parametric domain Event (S ,S )  : both firms are successful 
Events 
(S,F) or 
(F ,S)  
Equilibrium profile 
Type of 
equilib­
rium 
Equilibrium 
payoff 
Winner's 
payoff 
<%r)ar(z) (Patent, Patent) UNE-1 \s(T) 
zO)  >S(T)> ny(z )  (Patent, Patent) UNE-1 r(z) 
ny(z )> S{T)> nr ( z ) /2  (Patent, Patent) UNE-2 \S (T)  r(z) 
l i y ( z ) /2  >  S(T)  >  w(z ) /3  (Patent, Patent) RDE \S (T)  y (z )  
a(r)=/,r(z)/3 (a , I -a )  =  (1 /2 ,1 /2 )  MSE r ( z )  
/,r(z)/3>«?(T) (Secret, Secret) RDE j r ( z )  r(z) 
Notes: UNE-1 = Unique Nash equilibrium (Pareto efficient); 
UNE-2 = Unique Nash equilibrium (prisoner's dilemma); 
RDE = Risk-dominant equilibrium; and, 
MSB = Mixed strategy equilibrium. 
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Figure 1. The model with both patents and trade secrets 
S(T)  S (T)  
\ Patent 
Patent 
Secret^-# (S(T), 0) 
(0 ,S (T) )  
Secret 
SS, 
Secret 
Patent SF 
FS Secret 
FF 
Patent 
(0,0) Secret 
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Figure 2. Correlation of R&D projects and Solution Concepts 
a, 
p+s 
^(z) /yy(z) y(z) 
f(T) 
<-
MNE 
-><-
UNE-2 UNE-1 
-> (type of equilibria) 
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Figure 3. Example 
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1 
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Figure 4 
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Appendix to Chapter 2. 
In this section, we economize on the notation as follows; p x  = p(a x ) ,  p 2  = p(a 2 ) ,  
P F F  - prob{FF}, ^ , and pss = prob{SS). 
A.l. On the Assumption 1: 
A.l.l. The part on the covariance term: 
Recall that covariance is defined as Cov(X u X 2 )  =  p-s jp \ (1 P\)P20 ~ Pi) and written as the 
function of project choices, C(a x , a 2 )  =  p(a ] ,  a 2  )- s jp (a ] ) [ \ -  p (a x  ) ]  p 2  [l - p(a2 )] for all 
(ax,a2)e [0,l]x[0,l]. Because covariance is assumed to be non-negative (as in Dasgupta and Maskin, 
1987) and C(l, 1) = 0, it implies that p(ax,ax)> 0 and yo(l,l) = 0, respectively. Defining 
~p = /?(0,0) < 1 as the maximum positive correlation and p = p(0) as the maximum unconditional 
probability of success, one can obtain Cov(0,0) = pp( 1 - p). Moreover, the covariance function is 
symmetric in project choices, that is C(a,,a2) - C(a2,ax ), V (ax,a2) e [0,1]x[0,1] as the success 
probability function p(-) is the same for both firms. Because covariance is decreasing in either 
project choices at, its first order derivative (F.O.D.) with respect to project choices a, must be non-
positive. Without loss of generality, focus on the F.O.D. of covariance with respect to ax : 
dCov(X x ,X 2 )  d (p^Var(X x )Var(X 2 ) )  
dax da. 
dVar(X, ) 
which can be further arranged as 
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3(Kw(%,)) 
(Al) 
Sa, da, 2 Var(X { )  
The symmetric version of this condition applies for firm 2. Recall that p> 0. Because 
d(Var(Xx)) _ dp, 
da, 5a, 
(1-2^) (A.2) 
In particular, if p(a)  <  j  for all a  in the domain (as is assumed in Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987 and 
in the Example), then < q Hence; assuming —— <0 as in the Example would be sufficient 
da,- dai 
to sign the derivative of covariance in a t  as negative. Finally, if p{a t )  >  ^  for some a t  in the 
domain, then dVar(X,) > q jjence> jt wouy necessary to assume —— <0 to sign the derivative of 
dat dai 
covariance in at as negative, which, however, would be no longer sufficient. One would need a 
stronger condition in that case. Specifically, for i = 1,2 
dVar jX , )  
(A.3) 
2 
A.1.2 The part on the curvature of the probability of event (F ,F)  :  
In the following, we discuss the implications of this assumption: The assumption that the 
probability of event (F, F) in (l.d), denoted by pFF is strictly convex is equivalent to assuming 
that the objective function of the social planner in equation (2) is strictly concave. The assumption on 
the curvature of the probability of event (F,F) implies that the Hessian matrix for pFF is 
positive semi definite, which in turn has the following implications: 
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Lemma A.l pSF is concave in ax and pFS is concave in a2 • 
Proof Because the Hessian matrix for p F F  is positive semi definite, > 0 and d f F /  > 0 . 11 oa{ oa2 
Using the relations pFF = L-pS F  ~  P I  =  P F S  ~  P I  , which can be obtained from equation (1), it 
follows that = and ^ = -^>0. 
da: da, da, da. 
Lemma A.2 - Ô PsF 
da2da, 
> 0  .  
Proof Because the Hessian matrix for pFF is positive semi definite, d 3 PJF - tfPFF da, da2 >0 and 
together with the relations p F F  - I -p S F  -p 2 -  1 ~P F s~P\  , the claim follows. Note also that 
d PFF d PSF PFS ^ Pss 
da,da2 da2da, da2da, da2da, 
Corollary A.1 The objective junctions of the firms (equation (4.1) for firm 1) are strictly concave. 
Proof Twice differentiate the objective function of firm 1 (equation (5.1)) and use the relation that 
Pss ~ P\~ PSF to obtain 
5  P S F  
dal 
™<o™ >o 
da 
<0 
<0 by Lemma A. 1 
The case for firm 2 is symmetric. 
Corollary A.2 d
2v, d% d'v, d% ; Q 
daf dal da,da2 da2da, 
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Proof Obtain the following expressions by differentiating objective functions of the firms (equation 
(4.1) for firm 1 ) and using the relations pFF = p S P  ~ P I  = ^ ~ P F S ~ P \  ' •  
Define 
oa2da\ oq^oci^ oct^oci^ 
_ d2Vx d2V2 d2Vx d2V2 A = ' - 2 (A.4) 
ôax da2 oaxda2 oa2oax 
Plug the corresponding expressions above in the preceding equation for A and obtain 
A = ([/,)' 
<0 <0 >0 <0 <0 
>0 
+ (U S  -  U s s )  d PSF ^ PFS / d Pss \2 ^da2do, ' > 0  
>0 by Lemma A.2 
Corollary A3 Nash Equilibrium for firms' project choice game in the market exists, unique and 
globally asymptotically stable. 
Proof Firstly, strategy sets of players, are closed, convex, bounded, and orthogonal, (that is, the set 
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of feasible strategy profiles is the direct product of individual player's strategy spaces) as at G [0,1] 
for i G {1,2} . Moreover, from Corollary A.l, the objective functions of firms are continuous and 
concave in their respective project choices, therefore Nash equilibrium exists (Rosen, 1965).12 From 
Corollaries 1 and 2, the Jacobian of the matrix of best response functions is negative definite, which is 
sufficient for the remaining claims (Rosen, 1965).13 
A.2 Sufficient conditions for interior solutions 
In the following, we provide sufficient conditions (equations (A.8) and (A.9) below) for 
interior solutions. Let j and |oc,ac j be the solutions to the social planner's and firms' 
problems (equations (2) and (4), respectively). For these solutions to lie in the interior of the domain, 
that is, a e (0,1) and ac G (0,1) the following conditions are sufficient: 
(A.5) 
^W,<0 (A.6) 
Using the relation pSF = P\~ pss in equation (5.1) yields 
12 Rosen, J. B., 1965, Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games 
Econometrica, 33(3), 520-534. 
13 Rosen (1965) defines an appropriate dynamic model for concave n-person games (that is, games in 
which each player's payoff function is concave in his own strategy), where starting from any point in 
the domain each player changes its own strategy in the direction of gradient so that its own payoff 
function would increase as other players sticked to their current strategies, which defines a set of 
differential equations. Whenever the conditions for uniqueness of Nash equilibrium are satisfied, he 
shows that the system of differential equations will always converge to the unique equlibrium point of 
the original game. Therefore, the unique Nash equilibrium of the game is globally asymptotically 
stable. 
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^^1 I _ TT ^P\ I I (TT T T \^PSF I / A Tv 
-T—\al=a2=0-USST^\a,=Q+y(JS USS)^. L,=a2=0 <A ') da, ' 2 da, v , ' da, ^ 2 
<o ? 
Although assuming that 
d^SF I >0 
•So, ,_a2"° 
is sufficient for the social planner's solution to lie away from origin (see equation (3)), it is only 
necessary condition for solution to the firms' problem to lie in the interior. Now, 
——-—y\-P2)  :  dax dax dax 
<o <o 
Plugging the corresponding expression for the first order derivative of covariance from equation (A.l) 
in the preceding equation yields 
<o 
-Jrar(%2)Jr^,)-|r-da1 
Evaluating the preceding equation at a, = a2 = 0 by noting that p(ax = 0, a2 = 0) = p < 1 and 
p = p{0) yields 
 ^^-o)[(1 ~p)~ I(! "2rtI _<1 " p)p^x 
=^ U,,o K'-pXi-|)+yp)] - 0 - p)p^ I, 
Plug the preceding equation in {A . l )  and obtain 
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>0 
<0 
= ([/a +% -%)W^^I,,=o 
=(^+^(i-^))MHi)I ^ _(^_^xi-^jk| 
oax ' oax ' -
Now, the condition (A. 5) is equivalent to 
3Pii %-%) n ~w 9P. x 
<o 
, which can be arranged as 
Uss <o 
Because it is assumed that C/y > 2Uss > 0, it is sufficient to assume that 
7ïQ-pM-Ë~y-'--°) (A'8) 
<0 
Recall that y /  = (1 - /?)(1 - y) + ^ -p )  <1 as 0< p<\  and 0<p<\ .  
Now, focus on the condition in (A.6): It is sufficient for both solutions to social planner's and 
firms' problems to lie away from 1. For the social planner's problem, condition (A.6) means that the 
f i r s t  o rder  der iva t ive  (F .O.D. )  o f  i t s  ob jec t ive  func t ion  wi th  respec t  to  a ,  i s  nega t ive  a t  a x -a 2 - \  
(see equation (3)). For firms' problem in a market setting, condition in (A.6) is sufficient as follows: 
Use the relation pSF = px - pss and evaluate the F.O.D. of firm l's objective function (left hand side 
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of equation (5.1) for firm 1) at a x =a 2 =l  and obtain 
I _ T T ÔP(al) I | ST J TT -V ÔPsp | Q 
>  > o  ' — v  '  
<0 <0 by condition in (A.5) 
Now, recall that p = p(\)>0 , p{ax = \,a2 = 1) = 0 , and Cov(Xx,X2) = p^j px(\- px)p2(l- p2) • 
Note that if p = p(l) = 0 , then Cov(Xx,X2) is not differentiate with respect to project choices at 
a, =l,a2 =1 . Therefore, we need to assume that p = p( 1) > 0 . Then, evaluating equation (A.6) at 
a\ - a2 ~ 1 yields 
Then, the condition (A.6) is equivalent to 
V <0 ' 
A  3 . 1  O n  t h e  s l o p e s  o f  b e s t  r e s p o n s e  f u n c t i o n s  
Project choices can be strategic complements or substitutes, which is admissible as the Nash 
Equilibrium is unique and globally asymptotically stable. In the following, we provide an analysis of 
the slopes of best response functions: 
Without loss of generality consider firm 1. The best response function of firm 1 is defined by 
the identity 
dV x (a c x {a 2 ) ,a 2 )  
dax 
The slope for the best response function of firm 1 is obtained by differentiating this identity 
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c  ( a i  ( a 2  ) ' a 2  )  
a\ (a2) da;dfl, 
Qa~ ^2^l(ai (ai\ai) 
Its sign is determined by the sign of numerator because the denominator is negative by Corollary A.l. 
Now, 
uCt^u^\ 1 ] 
Because — P \~  Pss  > 
^ +y,# 
OCl 2 ^1 
<0 
^ da2dax 
Therefore, 
Now, 
g 2  
—> 0 o Project choices are strategic substitutes 
da2dax 
q2 
— < 0 o  P r o j e c t  c h o i c e s  a r e  s t r a t e g i c  c o m p l e m e n t s  
da2dax 
d2Pss _ dP\ dP2 , d 1 Cov(X ] ,X 2 )  ^ A 1 Q ^  
da2dax dax da2 da2dax 
<0 <0 ? 
Observe that if 3 ^ 0 , then project choices are strategic substitutes. Otherwise, the net 
effect matters. Differentiate equation (A.l) with respect to a2 and obtain 
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2 2 „ , 
g Cov(X l ,X 2 )  + TTT77T 
da2dax da2oax oax 2 Var{X2) 
? 
a(Kar(%J) 
5C0V(X1,X2) 1 5a, 
da2 2 Far(X,) 
By Assumption 1, we have ^ 0 . Assume also that J^- < 0 . Moreover, = 0 under 
linear parameterization of correlation coefficient, which is also adopted in Dasgupta and Maskin 
(1987). Furthermore, if it were the case that p(a) < j for all a e[0,l] (as in Dasgupta and Maskin, 
1987), then ^ < 0 and from equation (A.2), which would imply that 
8 > 0 , therefore > 0 from equation (A. 10), whereby one could sign project choices 
as strategic substitutes. However, it may be the case that p(at ) > Y for some at G [0,1] and 
i G {1,2} , therefore, > 0 and >0 at these points, which in turn implies that 
5 ^da^a'*2^ < Then, in that case the net effect matters in signing in equation (A. 10). 
A.3.2 On the proof of Lemma 1 
In the following, we elaborate on the proof of Lemma 1. Let (ac ,ac ) be the unique Nash 
equilibrium to the firms' non cooperative game in the market. They are best responses to each other, 
therefore, satisfy F.O.C.s (equation (5)) 
da. 
oa2 
Differentiate these conditions with respect to Us and obtain 
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1 
-1 
d(j\ 
au, dal da,da2 
84 a^^ 
a^ da2da, |_at/s 
which leads to 
^ i ^ 8"^ % 
dU s  A da\ dUs dalda2 dUs 
for firm 1 (the case for firm 2 is symmetric) where À is the determinant of the matrix of second-
order derivatives of the objective functions of firms as defined in equation (A.4). From Corollary A.2, 
A > 0 and the second order sufficient conditions hold for firms' problem in a market setting, therefore 
< 0 and —r < 0 . Note that the sign of / !* , which determines the sign of the slope of best 
da; Sal 00,00, ^ 
response function for firm 1 can go either way, that is, projects can be strategic complements or 
substitutes as discussed in the preceding section. One can also show that = ~~ at symmetric 
points. Then, 
(A.„) 
dUs A daj daxda2 dUs 
? 
at symmetric points. We sign the term (^—- ) as negative at the symmetric points as follows: 
Consider the case of strategic complements: that is > 0. Then, (-^t~ gag'a ) < 0 . Consider the 
^ >o 
d2V d2V d2V 
case of strategic substitutes, that is, 5a8'a < 0. Now, = —r holds at symmetric points, then 
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À = a^ a^ gzp, a^ 
ôa[ ôa\ Sa,da2 ôa2dax 
2 
"a^" 
2 
" a^ " 
da\ daxda2 
-X 
a^z, a^ 
a^ daxda2 
<0 <0 
= (  
Because À > 0 , it implies that (^f - g^'a ) < 0 . Hence, 
da . sdfa Slgn(-rz—) = sign(—~) 
ac/j ac/^ 
Now, from equation (5.1), 
d<f\ _ dPsF 
dUs dax 
which is positive at the market solution (a c , a c  ) from the proof of Proposition 1. Moreover, 
equation (A.l 1) can be further arranged as 
1 ÔPSF 
Then, at symmetric market equilibrium, the resulting increase in project choice of firm 1 is higher if 
projects are strategic complements than the case that they are strategic substitutes as expected. 
Similarly differentiating the F.O.Cs (equation (5.1) for firm 1) with respect to Uss yields 
aof i ,a% a& a^ a& , 
— -—rv~r~T"T7T r—„rr ) dUss A " da\ dUss daxda2dUss 
One can similarly establish that 
5a, d/fa 
sign(—^-) = sign(—— ) 
dUss 3USS 
From equation (5.1) 
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d(h = dPss 
3U S S  da x  
which is negative everywhere in the domain, and at the symmetric market equilibrium, (a c , a c )  
particular. Finally, one can similarly verify that the resulting decrease in project choice of firm 1 
higher if projects are strategic complements than the strategic substitutes case as expected. 
For the remaining claim in Lemma 1, because Us > 0 arrange the payoff parameters in 
F.O.Cs (equation (5)) as 
Uss dprob(S,S) |  dprob(S ,F)  
Us da{ dax 
Uss dprob(S, S) | dprob(F ,S)  Q  
Us da 2 ôa2 
Having defined R = , one can similarly establish that ac is decreasing in R . 
Us 
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CHAPTER 3. ON THE "CO-EXISTENCE" BETWEEN GENETICALLY MODIFIED, 
CONVENTIONAL, AND ORGANIC PRODUCTS IN EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE: 
A MULTI-MARKET EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS1 
Abstract 
Although genetically modified (GM) crops have been quickly adopted in certain parts of the world, 
they have met with resistance from consumers in the European Union (EU) market. This has resulted 
in a complex (and ongoing) EU regulation, which envisions the co-existence of GM food with 
conventional and quality-enhanced products. As the regulation mandates the labeling and traceability 
of GM content in all stages of production and allows only a stringent adventitious presence of GM 
content in other products, it implies significant economic costs. Based on a partial equilibrium model 
of the EU agricultural food sector, we analyze the economic implications of introduction of GM food 
in the EU market. We develop, calibrate and simulate a model that captures the main features of the 
problem at hand. We find that the introduction of GM food is reducing overall welfare but the 
producers of quality-enhanced products become better off, a result that is robust to variations in the 
values of critical parameters. 
1 This is a joint paper with GianCarlo Moschini and Luigi Cembalo. 
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1. Introduction 
The advent of biotechnology in agriculture has resulted in momentous (and ongoing) adjustments in 
the agricultural and food sector. Over the course of only a few years, a large portion of the area 
cultivated to some basic commodities has been converted to planting of genetically modified (GM) 
crops. James (2003) reports that global planting of GM crops reached 67.7 million hectares in 2003, 
virtually all of which comprised four commodities: corn, soybean, cotton, and canola. The hallmark 
of these GM crops, relative to those deriving from prior breeding programs, is an exciting novel 
scientific approach: insertion of foreign genetic material that confers a specific attribute of great 
interest (such as herbicide ot pest resistance). Somewhat paradoxically, the novelty of GM crops 
explains both the enthusiastic support of their proponents and the widespread consumer and public 
opposition that has hampered adoption in a number of countries. Indeed, as of now, GM crop 
adoption has been confined to a limited number of countries (the United States, Argentina, Canada, 
and China accounted for about 95% of total GM crop cultivation in 2003). Elsewhere, GM crop 
adoption has been slowed or hampered by novel regulation, apparently in response to the 
aforementioned vigorous public opposition (Sheldon, 2002). 
Whereas some earlier studies have documented sizeable efficiency gains attributable to new 
GM crops (Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson, 2000; Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky, 2000), it has 
become clear that a major feature of this new technology deserves careful scrutiny from an economic 
perspective. Specifically, a possibly large share of consumers perceives food made from GM 
products as weakly inferior in quality relative to traditional food. But the mere introduction of GM 
crops means that, to deliver traditional GM-free food, additional costs must be incurred (relative to 
the pre-innovation situation). This is because the commodity-based production, marketing, and 
processing system, long relied upon by the food industry, is not suited to avoid the commingling of 
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GM and non-GM crops.2 To satisfy the demand for non-GM food, costly identity preservation (IP) 
and segregation activities are required. Thus, the innovation process has, in this context, brought 
about a new market failure, essentially an externality on the production of traditional food products 
(Lapan and Moschini, 2004). 
Nowhere has the public concern about GM products affected the regulatory process more 
than in the European Union (EU). An earlier laissez-faire approach, during which several GM 
products were approved, came to a halt in 1998 when the EU instituted a controversial de facto 
moratorium on new GM products. The extensive re-examination of the EU regulations pertaining to 
GM products that followed has produced a new framework meant to foster food safety, protect the 
environment, and ensure consumers' "right to know." The system is centered on the notions of 
labeling and traceability (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a). Specifically, the new 
EU regulations require that food and feed consisting of, or produced from, GM crops be clearly 
labeled as such and envision a system that guarantees full traceability of food products put on the 
marketplace. Mandatory labeling is to apply to food and feed produced from GM crops, including 
food from GM products even when it does not contain protein or DNA from the GM crop (e.g., beet 
sugar). The threshold for avoiding the GM label is quite stringent: only a 0.9% adventitious presence 
of (authorized) GM products in food is tolerated for a product marketed without a GM label. 
Perhaps in recognition of the interdependence and externalities characterizing GM crop 
adoption, the EU is developing measures aimed at the "coexistence" between GM and non-GM 
agriculture (Commission of the European Communities, 2003b). The following extensive quote 
clarifies the EU position on this matter (European Union, 2003): 
"The issue of co-existence refers to the ability offarmers to provide consumers with 
a choice between conventional, organic and GM products that comply with European 
labeling and purity standards. Co-existence is not about environmental or health 
risks because only GM crops that have been authorized as safe for the environment 
2 Indeed, contamination of traditional crops with undesired GM traits can arise before the farm gate, at the 
stage of seed production, and at the farm production stage, through cross-pollination with neighboring farms. 
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and for human health can be cultivated in the EU. Since different types of 
agricultural production are not naturally separated, suitable measures during 
cultivation, harvest, transport, storage and processing are needed in order to 
manage the possible accidental mixing (admixture) of GM and non-GM crops 
resulting from seed impurities, cross-pollination, volunteer and harvesting-storage 
practices. Co-existence is concerned with the potential economic loss through the 
admixture of GM and non-GM crops which could lower their value, with identifying 
workable management measures to minimize admixture and with the cost of these 
measures. " 
Thus, the unintended economic implications of the introduction of GM crops are very much at 
the forefront here and motivate our study. Whereas the EU proposal contains fairly detailed 
suggestions on measures that are deemed necessary to ensure co-existence, the scale of the economic 
problem at hand has not, to date, been analyzed in a coherent economic model. Indeed, current 
analysis on the economic impacts of GM product adoption have either assumed that GM and non-GM 
products are equivalent (Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson, 2000; Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky, 
2000; Demont and Tollens, 2004; Demont, Wesseler, and Tollens, 2004) or that there are two 
qualitatively different products—one GM and one non-GM—such that non-GM products are treated 
as one type of good (Desquilbet and Bullock, 2001; Fulton and Giannakas, 2004; Lapan and 
Moschini, 2004). 
The latter approach does reveal some important insights into the economics of GM crop 
adoption, including the finding that the GM innovation, in the end, may not improve welfare. But 
existing models are not refined enough to assess the differential impact that GM adoption may have 
when pre-existing products are already differentiated. In particular, the co-existence issue detailed 
earlier explicitly indicates the need to allow for three distinct products (conventional, organic and 
GM). Furthermore, while it has been shown that the welfare impact of GM innovation is ambiguous, 
it is unclear what market conditions are required to produce negative as opposed to positive welfare 
effects. In the context of a larger model that tries to accommodate the three types of products singled 
out by the co-existence issue, such welfare effects are likely to depend on the interdependence 
between markets. More specific attention to such multi-market effects appear warranted. 
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In this paper we develop a modeling framework that extends previous work by considering the 
introduction of GM products in a system where two differentiated products already exist: 
"conventional" food and "quality-enhanced" food. In the empirical part of the paper, the latter is 
identified with "organic" food, although more generally it is intended to refer to a broader set of 
products that Europeans claim as a distinguishing feature of their agriculture (Fishier, 2002). The 
notion of "organic food" refers to the products of regulated production processes that essentially 
forego the use of a range of chemical inputs (fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides) that are widely 
used in conventional agriculture. What specifically can be called "organic" is a matter of national 
regulations, and the EU has its own rules and standards.3 More than 24 million hectares worldwide 
are currently cultivated with practices that can claim to be organic (Wilier and Yussefi, 2004). In the 
EU, organic production accounts for about 3% of the utilized agricultural area (UAA). But the EU 
recognizes that a large number of other food products can claim superior quality attributes. The 
identification of these products in the marketplace is promoted by EU regulations that established 
special labels known as PDO (Protected Designation of Origin), PGI (Protected Geographical 
Indication) and TSG (Traditional Speciality Guaranteed).4 
A first contribution of the paper is to derive a model of differentiated food demand that is 
consistent with the stylized attribute of the problem at hand. Specifically, we derive a demand system 
that admits three food products: conventional food, organic food, and GM food (in addition to a 
numéraire good). The GM good is a weakly inferior substitute for the conventional food, and the 
model is specified in such a fashion that all of the relevant parameters can be identified from 
observation of the pre-innovation equilibrium. The supply side similarly accounts explicitly for the 
production of two and three products (before and after the GM innovation, respectively). For the 
3 See the EU Web page on "Organic Agriculture" at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/qual/organic/. 
4 At present there are more than 600 food products in the EU that can claim such "quality" labels, although their 
importance in terms of market share (and ultimately in terms of land used in their production) is not known. 
See the EU Web page on "Quality Policy" at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/foodqual/qualil en.htm. 
52 
"quality" agricultural product, the quality enhancement is modeled as deriving from additional efforts 
supplied by producers. Equilibrium conditions account explicitly for the IP costs that are necessary 
after the introduction of GM products and endogenize the price of land as well as the reward to the 
additional efforts supplied by farmers. The model is calibrated to replicate observed data of EU 
agriculture, based on assumed values of some critical parameters. The solution of the model—for 
baseline parameter values as well as other alternatives—allows us to determine the qualitative and 
quantitative economic impacts of the adoption of GM crops in the EU. 
2. Modeling strategy 
We seek a model that strikes a balance between the competing needs of details and simplicity—the 
former allowing us to represent the problem of interest with some accuracy; the latter providing the 
necessary modeling abstraction for some unambiguous results to emerge. Because we are dealing 
with at least three products, it is not possible to derive unambiguous results for the market and 
welfare effects of GM innovation under general demand and supply conditions. In addition to the 
ambiguities that may result from unrestricted demand substitution possibilities,5 the innovation that 
we are modeling entails a market failure, as discussed in the introduction. Thus, the post-innovation 
equilibrium is bound to represent a second-best situation—for example, both an increase and a 
decrease of aggregate welfare are possible. Standard comparative statics analysis is bound to produce 
inconclusive results. To proceed, the strategy that we adopt is to restrict the specification of both 
demand and supply relations to capture some stylized facts of GM product innovation. Having done 
that, we calibrate the model such that the chosen parameters are consistent with generally accepted 
attributes of the agricultural sector and can replicate exactly the benchmark data set. By solving the 
5 Even in a simpler two-product case, Lapan and Moschini (2004) show that some additional restrictions on 
demand, over and above the properties that result from standard utility maximization, are required. 
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model thus calibrated under various assumptions, we can then shed some light on both the qualitative 
and quantitative potential effects of large-scale GM product adoption on European agriculture. 
A major issue in the GM policy debate concerns consumers' attitudes toward these new 
products. In representing the demand side of the market, therefore, we allow for the fact that the three 
food products are perceived as differentiated by consumers. But we also want to capture some 
stylized facts about consumer preferences with respect to these goods. Specifically, conventional 
food is deemed no worse than GM food—in the definition of Lapan and Moschini (2004), GM food is 
a "weakly inferior" substitute for conventional food. It seems that individual preferences are also 
quite heterogeneous with respect to our other product, organic food. But whereas some consumers 
have a strong preference for organic food, often based on perceived health, environmental, and 
animal-welfare considerations, other consumers may, ceteris paribus, prefer conventional food based 
on other quality attributes (such as appearance, integrity, and taste). Thus, in particular, the 
assumption that convention food is "weakly inferior" to organic food would seem untenable. Hence, 
we develop a demand framework whereby organic and conventional food products are "horizontally 
differentiated" whereas GM and non-GM food products are "vertically differentiated." We submit 
that this novel approach, detailed in the section to follow, captures in an effective way the main 
attributes of demand in our context. 
As for the supply side, an essential facet of the "co-existence" issue relates to the adjustments 
in production brought about by the innovation adoption, in particular with regard to the welfare of 
farmers. Concerning the latter, in a purely competitive sector such as agriculture, returns to producers 
must be associated with the presence of some fixed factors of production. Land being the obvious 
such fixed factor, in our model we represent the entire agricultural sector and assume that there is a 
given endowment of land that can be used to produce two outputs before GM innovation 
(conventional and organic products) and that there are three outputs after GM innovation 
(conventional, organic, and GM products). Furthermore, it is apparent that organic products 
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command a sizeable price premium over conventional ones, while organic production only accounts 
for a small share of overall production. The modeling avenue that we postulate to account for such 
stylized facts is that organic production requires an additional input in the form of farmer-supplied 
effort, and that this required extra labor input has an upward-sloping supply. This is certainly 
consistent with the observation that organic production is typically more labor intensive, with 
customized labor tasks substituting for inadmissible chemical inputs. Because this modeling strategy 
effectively suffices in discriminating conventional and organic production, we then proceed by 
assuming that land quality is homogeneous.6 
Moving to equilibrium considerations, a critical need in this setting is to represent the novel 
impacts of GM product introduction in the marketplace. As discussed in the introduction, this 
requires an explicit consideration of the costs of identity preservation activities that are required, after 
innovation adoption, to supply non-GM products to the consumers who want them. Furthermore, as 
discussed by Lapan and Moschini (2004), it may be of interest to distinguish between the cost of 
identity preservation itself with the additional burden that may be imposed by specific product 
labeling rules. Whereas food labeling in general serves the ultimate purpose of conveying useful 
information to consumers (Golan et al., 2000), mandating that the inferior product carry the "GM 
label," as required by the recently approved EU rules, appears to do little in that regard. In particular, 
requiring GM products to identify themselves via a label does not alleviate the cost of identity 
preservation (to be borne by non-GM suppliers) that is necessary to provide consumers with 
(credible) non-GM food. Put another way, from an information economics point of view it is the 
"superior" (i.e., non-GM) product that should carry the label. Thus, in our model we try to 
distinguish between the effects of identity preservation (of the superior products) and the impact of 
labeling and traceability requirements (on the inferior product). 
6 Admittedly this is a simplification. But we would argue that the alternative of also allowing for a 
heterogeneous land endowment would add little additional economic insight while adding considerable burden 
to the model. 
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A final consideration about our model is worth noting. The model that we develop and solve 
is calibrated at the farm-gate level. Accordingly, the demand functions that we consider must be 
interpreted as "derived demands." In addition to reflecting the nature of final EU consumer demand, 
such derived demands implicitly account for the (net) excess demand for EU products originating 
from the export market. Thus, although the model is isomorphic to the representation of a close 
economy sector, it is in fact consistent with an open economy setting. 
3. The model 
Based on the foregoing, the demand, supply and equilibrium conditions of an agricultural and food 
sector before and after GM innovation are specified as follows. 
3.1. Demand 
Because it is widely accepted that such features of food demand arise from a collection of consumers 
that manifest widely differing attitudes towards organic and GM food, it is useful to derive aggregate 
demand explicitly from the specification of individual consumer preferences. To implement the 
notion of "weakly inferior" substitutes, we extend the vertical product differentiation model with unit 
demand of Mussa and Rosen (1978) (see also Tirole, 1988, chapter 7). In that setting, one postulates 
a population of consumers with heterogeneous preferences concerning two goods (in addition to the 
numéraire) but in which all consumers agree that one good is no worse than the other, ceteris paribus. 
We generalize that framework by allowing one additional good, such that the individual agent utility 
function is defined over four goods: conventional food qn , organic food qb, GM food qg, and a 
composite good y (the numéraire).7 Furthermore, consumers here are not restricted to buy one unit 
of the product but decide how much to purchase (in addition to which good to purchase). As in the 
7 The subscript n stands for "normal," the subscript b stands for "biologic" (the attribute for "organic" in many 
European languages), and the subscript g stands for "genetically" modified. 
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standard vertical product differentiation model, preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear, such that 
the individual consumer's utility function is written with the following structure: 
where the function u(.) is assumed to be concave, and 6 is an individual parameter that characterizes 
the heterogeneity of consumers vis-à-vis their preference for GM food relative to conventional food. 
Note that, absent GM food, the utility function (apart from the numéraire) reduces to 
u{qn,qb). Thus, conventional and organic foods are treated as imperfect substitutes, but with no 
presumption that one is uniformly better than the other for all consumers. On the other hand, to 
capture the fact that GM food is assumed to be a weakly inferior substitute for the conventional food, 
we assume that the distribution of the corresponding parameter satisfies 6 e [0,1]. In the foregoing 
specification, each individual consumer will consume two goods: either organic and conventional, or 
organic and GM, although the heterogeneity of consumers implies that, in aggregate, all three food 
types may be consumed.8 
More specifically, the consumer will buy the GM good if and only if pg < 6pn , whereas he 
or she would buy the conventional food if pg > 6pn ,9 So, let Q = qn+ 0qg and let Pq & ^pn,pgjO^ 
denote the price of Q that applies (depending on whether qn or qg is consumed). Now consider the 
problem of choosing Q and qh with the utility function rewritten as U = y + u(Q,qb). Then the 
optimality conditions for an interior solution are Uq{Q,qb) = pg and w (Q,qb) = pb, which yield the 
individual demand functions dg{pQ,pb) and db(pQ,pb). 
8 We assume that u(q) is such that the consumer will buy some amount of one of the goods, and that income is 
sufficiently high so that an interior solution holds. 
9 The consumer is indifferent between the two varieties if the equality holds, but we will make the conventional 
assumption that, under equality, the GM food is purchased. 
(1) 
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As for the choice between qn and qg, as discussed earlier, that will depend on how the price 
ratio pg j pn relates to 6. Let G = |(9e[0,l] | 6> pg/pn} denote the set of individuals that, at given 
prices, will prefer the GM product (this set is empty if pg > pn ), and let jV = |<9 e [0,1] 16 < pg/pn] 
denote the set of individuals that, at given prices, will prefer the conventional product. Then 
individuals of type 6 e N will buy 
<ln=dQ(pn,pb), qb=db(pn,pb), and qg= 0 (2) 
whereas those of type 0 e G  will buy 
Q n = 0  '  %  = d b ( P g / d > P b ) >  and < l g  = ^ j d Q ( P g / 0 > P b )  (3) 
Market demand functions are obtained by integrating over all types. Thus, 
D n ( P n > P g > P b ) =  J dQ(Pn>Pb)dF{6) (4) 
b&N 
D g ( P n > P g > P b ) =  J ~ n d Q  { P g / @ > P b ) d F ( & )  (5) 
d e  G °  
Db(Pn>Pg>Pb)= J db(pn,pb)dF(0)+ J db(pg/0,pb)dF(e) (6) 
6eN 0eG 
where F(9) denotes the distribution function of consumer types.10 
To find an explicit representation of demand functions, we parameterize the utility function 
as follows: 
r „ \ 1 r- - e~1 
1-A (7) 
\ S  —  l j  
where the parameter Â e (0,1) controls the share between conventional and organic food, the 
p a r a m e t e r  s  >  0  ( s  #  l )  c o n t r o l s  t h e  o v e r a l l  f o o d  d e m a n d  e l a s t i c i t y ,  a n d  t h e  p a r a m e t e r  k > 0  
10 Note that this formulation is general enough to accommodate continuous, discrete, and mixed distributions of 
consumer types. 
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controls the size of the market. Given this utility function, it is easily verified that the individual 
demand functions display constant elasticity, specifically, 
dQ(pe,pb) = K\pe)-UW-°\pbf-™-i) (8) 
MPQ-Pb) = K{PQ)M' (9) 
where K = 1 - A)-0-f)(W) _ 
Finally, to get closed-form solutions for the market demand function we need to make 
assumptions about the distribution of consumer types (i.e., the parameter 0 ). To this end, we wish to 
allow for a fraction of consumers to be "indifferent" between conventional and GM products. Given 
the choice, such consumers would simply buy the less costly of the two goods. Thus we specify a 
mixed distribution function F(0) such that for a fraction <f> G (0,1) of consumers the type is 0 = 1, 
whereas for the remaining consumers the type Q is uniformly distributed on [0,1)Hence, the 
density f{0) = F'{0) on [0,1) is f{0)-\-tj>. 
Given that, evaluating the integrals in equations (4)-(6), given the individual demands in 
equations (8)-(9), for the case pn > pg we obtain 
f p \ 
D n  ( P n > P g > P b )  =  d Q ( P n > P b ) ( l - 0 )  ~  ( 1 0 )  
\ P n  J  
D g ( P n > P g > P b )  =  dQ( P g > P b ) [ 0  +  A ( P n > P g ) ]  ( 1 1 )  
/ X 
£ > b ( P n > P g > P b )  =  d b ( P n > P b ) ( l - < / > )  —  + d b ( p g , p b ) \ L ( \ - ( l > ) A ( p n , p g )  +  < f \  (12) 
V P n  )  
where dg(-,pb) and db(-,pb) are given by (8) and (9), and 
11 As suggested by a reviewer, the parameter <f> may also capture stylized facts about consumers' handling of 
label information (Noussair, Robin, and Ruffïeux, 2002). One could also postulate the existence of a fraction of 
consumers for which 0 = 0. But, as observed by this reviewer, imperfect information uptake from labels 
would spread this group, justifying the continuous distribution that we have postulated on [0,1). 
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Z 
1- ^ 
y P n  J  
(13) 
v 
For the case pn< pg, as noted earlier, Dg(pb,pn,pg) = 0 . Such a case describes the 
situation prior to the introduction of GM food, where Dg = 0 and the demands for conventional and 
organic food reduce to 
where, again, the functions d g ( -  , p b )  and d b { -  , p b )  are as defined in (8) and (9). Note that the 
demand structure for the new product is described in terms of the same underlying preference 
parameters (k, s, and X), a feature that is particularly convenient at the calibration and simulation 
stage. 
3.2. Production and supply 
To capture the essential elements of the "co-existence" issue for the supply side, as discussed earlier, 
we model the entire agricultural sector and assume that there is a given endowment of land that can 
be used to produce two outputs before GM innovation (conventional and organic products) and three 
outputs after GM innovation (conventional, organic, and GM products). To keep things as simple and 
transparent as possible for the purpose of calibration, and yet obtain non-trivial outcomes at the policy 
analysis stage, we assume constant returns to scale (at the industry level) for both conventional and 
GM production. Specifically, if xn denotes production of conventional food, n is the unit rental 
price of land, and w is the vector of prices of the intermediate inputs used in food production, the 
cost function can be written as 
(14) 
D b ( P n > P g > P b )  =  d b ( P n > P b )  (15) 
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cn(xn,w ,7i) = xn an7T + cn(w) (16) 
where an is a parameter that can be interpreted as the reciprocal of yield, and c" (w) is an increasing, 
linearly homogeneous, and concave function of prices. Note that this cost function is dual to a 
production function with a fixed proportion between land and a function of the bundle of market 
inputs (unrestricted substitutability between market inputs is thus allowed). 
Production of organic food, on the other hand, is assumed to require three types of inputs: 
land, market-supplied inputs, and farmer-supplied effort. Again we assume fixed proportions 
between land, a function of the bundle of market supply inputs, and farmer-supplied effort measured 
in some efficiency units. But for the latter we assume that the cost of drawing the required farmer-
supplied efforts into organic production are increasing at the margin. For instance, one can imagine a 
population of potential organic farmers, each with its own reservation price to enter this particular 
industry (the heterogeneity displaying different abilities for supplying the effort required in organic 
food production). If xb denotes the production of organic food, 
where ab is the parameter representing the reciprocal of yield, z is a variable that indexes farmer-
and concave in w, and increasing in z (more on this to follow). 
We measure conventional food and organic food in the same units. Typically, the 
presumption is that production per unit of land (i.e., yield) is lower in organic food production, which 
would imply ab > an . Furthermore, we assume that the price vector wof the intermediate inputs is 
given, and thus we subsume its effect in the unit sub-costs. Specifically, for the conventional product 
we write c" (w) = c such that (for given n and w ) conventional food production is a constant 
marginal cost industry. Organic production, on the other hand, is assumed to be an increasing cost 
(17) 
supplied inputs used in organic food production, and cb(w, z) is increasing, linearly homogeneous, 
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industry: at the margin, expanding organic production requires additional farmer-supplied inputs that 
are available only at increasing cost. To capture that, and still take all market prices as given, we 
write cb(w, z) = c • (1 + pz), where p> 0 is a parameter to be determined at the calibration stage. 
More specifically, we normalize z G [0,1] (without loss of generality, because units are arbitrary) so 
that we can interpret z as the fraction of land that is allocated to organic production. Given this, 
before the advent of GM products the marginal costs of production are written as, respectively, 
MCn -c + ann and MCb = c • (1 + pz) + abn . 
With the introduction of GM products, GM food production xg becomes feasible. Given the 
standard effects of first-generation GM agricultural products, which constitute almost the totality of 
GM crops being grown at present (James, 2003), we assume that the main attribute of GM crops is to 
provide higher production efficiency at the farm level. We model that by postulating that the GM 
technology cuts the cost of the bundle of market-supplied inputs,12 such that the unit cost of market-
supplied inputs for GM crop production is yc , where 0 < y < 1. But GM products also impose the 
need for IP, which we model by postulating a unit segregation cost sn on the production of 
conventional food, and a unit segregation cost sb on the production of organic food.13 
Furthermore, GM regulation may mandate an additional unit cost t for the producers of GM 
food (i.e., the traceability and mandatory labeling requirements envisioned by the EU). Thus, the 
introduction of GM products affects the production costs of all three food products, and the post-
innovation marginal production costs are represented by 
MCn =c + an7t + sn (18) 
12 This implicitly accounts for the fact that some input prices (e.g., improved seeds) may actually change with 
the introduction of GM technology. 
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MCb = c • (1 + pz) + abn + sb (19) 
MCg =yc + ann +1 (20) 
3.3. Equilibrium 
Based on the foregoing, and given a fixed amount of landZ, the (partial) competitive equilibrium in 
the agricultural sector after the GM innovation (assuming that all three products are produced) can be 
written as 
Pn =c + an7T*+sn (21) 
P*b=c-{\ + pz*) + AB7T*+SB  (22) 
p*g=yc + an7t* +1 (23) 
D b ( P b > P * n > P * g )  =  x * b  ( 2 4 )  
= ^ (25) 
(26) 
zL = abx*b (27) 
L = abxb + anxn + anx*g (28) 
j|( j|{  ^  ^  ^  ^
which can be solved for the post-innovation equilibrium values (xb,xn,xg,pb,pn,pg,z ,n ). The 
pre-innovation equilibrium is a special case, obtained by dropping equations (23) and (26), by setting 
sn - sb = t = 0 , and by constraining the price of the new product to pg (the "choke" price, that is, the 
13 The parameter sb will also capture the policies of organic food classification vis-à-vis the presence of trace 
amount of GM food. For example, the requirement of zero-tolerance of GM product in the US and EU organic 
food classification can be interpreted as increasing the value of sb. 
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price that would drive GM food demand to zero). The resulting conditions can then be solved for the 
pre-innovation equilibrium values (x*b, x*n, p*b,pn, z , n ). 
4. Data and calibration 
We present the data on the parameters of the model in Table 1, which refers to the year 2000. Data for 
the total EU utilized agricultural area (UAA) are obtained from the EU Directorate General for 
Agriculture (2003). The land utilized by the quality products (mostly represented by organic food), 
which is denoted by Lb, amounts to 2.9% of the total EU UAA (Hamm, Gronefeld, and Halpin, 
2002). The rest of the total EU UAA is assumed to be allocated to normal food production, which is 
denoted by Ln . The value of total agricultural production is obtained from the report of the EU 
Directorate General for Agriculture (2003). The value of quality food production is calculated based 
on data reported by Hamm, Gronefeld, and Halpin (2002).14 The difference between the values of 
total and the organic food production is accounted as the value of conventional food production. The 
price of conventional food is normalized to 1, so that the amount of conventional food production is 
the value of conventional food production. The yield for the conventional product is then calculated 
by dividing the estimated production in volume by the estimated land used for the conventional 
product. 
The price index for organic products that we have computed displays the price "premium" of 
such products over the conventional ones (the price of which was normalized to 1). Using this 
premium, the amount of organic food production is obtained by dividing the value of organic food 
with its price index. The yield for organic food production is calculated by dividing the amount of 
organic food production by the amount of land used in that industry. Using the data on average rent 
per hectare and the amount of agricultural land for each country in the EU (EU Directorate General 
14 Details are reported in the Appendix section. 
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for Agriculture, 2003), the rent attributable to total utilized land was calculated to be 11% of the total 
value of agriculture in the EU. The value of n (unit rent) is then obtained by dividing total rent by 
the total amount of land. Then, the average production cost for conventional food (c) was calculated 
as the difference between the price of conventional food and rent expense per unit of conventional 
food,  as  formulated in equation (21) (with sn  =0).  
The economics of identity preservation and segregation for different commodities and 
markets have been studied in recent years, and some preliminary estimates of likely segregation costs 
are available. In particular, the study by the European Commission (2002) analyzing possible 
scenarios for the co-existence of GM, conventional, and organic crops in the EU, estimated 
segregation costs for commodities. Expressing such costs as the percentage of corresponding 
commodity prices, IP costs were estimated in the ranges of 4.5% and 9.5% for maize and 1.4% and 
3.2% for potatoes (to meet a 1% threshold level). Moreover, Desquilbet and Bullock (2001) 
considered the segregation costs at the farm and handling stages to be 4% of the price the farmer gets 
and 20% of the handler's mark-up at maximum. Sobolevsky, Moschini, and Lapan (2004), following 
Lin, Chambers, and Harwood (2000), relied on a range of segregation costs between 3.4% and 10.3% 
of the average US producers' price for soybean. 
Based on the foregoing, in this study we took the segregation cost to be 5% of the selling price 
in the baseline solution. Therefore, using the pre-innovation price of conventional food in the market, 
which is normalized to equal 1, the segregation costs sn and sb for conventional and quality food 
products, respectively, are set to 0.05 euros per unit in the baseline scenario. 
For eight midwestem states, Bullock and Nitsi (2001) estimated that the introduction of 
glyphosate-resistent soybean technology, which is also known as Roundup Ready (RR) soybean 
technology, reduced the variable cost of production on average by 6.34% per conventional-till acre 
(and per bushel as yield was assumed to be the same for both RR and conventional technologies) and 
by 8.57% per no-till acre. These estimates included the decrease in production cost of non-RR 
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technology due to the decrease in price of non-glyphosate herbicides after the introduction of RR 
technology. Sobolevsky, Moschini, and Lapan (2004) estimated the cost reduction obtained by using 
RR soybean technology in Iowa to be between 1.4% and 3.4%, depending on the herbicide treatment. 
Note that both studies took into account the price premium paid to GM seeds. We assumed that the 
average cost of conventional production remains the same with the introduction of GM technology 
and assumed that the reduction in average cost obtained by producing GM food (net of GM seed 
markup) is equal to 2%. Therefore, y = 0.98. 
Labeling and traceability costs are implemented in the model by the parameter t. In the baseline 
solution we assume t = 0 but consider the effects of these costs by solving the model with alternative 
values of this parameter. 
Finally, the parameter representing the percentage of consumers who are indifferent between 
GM and conventional food versions (when the two varieties are offered at the same price) is taken to 
be (f> = 0.25 based on the representative surveys of European consumers (Moon and 
Balasubramanian, 2001, and Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux, 2002). As noted earlier, without loss of 
generality we assume that those indifferent consumers will purchase GM food (any other allocation of 
indifferent consumers could be implemented by changing the value of (f> ). 
Given the above, what remains is to calibrate the demand parameters (c > 0, K> 0, /I > 0 ) and 
the production parameter p> 0. We do so by ensuring that, given the other assumptions detailed in 
the foregoing, the chosen parameters make certain that the model predicts the observed prices and 
quantities for the benchmark year 2000. The value of the production parameter can be solved from 
equation (22) in the pre-innovation competitive equilibrium ( sb = 0 ) by using the data presented in 
Table 1, as follows. First, given the unit rent n = 208.8 computed as described earlier, from equation 
(21) (with sn - 0 ) the production cost parameter c must satisfy (pn - c)/an = 208.8. Next, given 
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n = 208.8 and z - 0.029 (obtained as the fraction of land allocated to organic production), from 
equation (22) of the pre-innovation equilibrium we solve for p = 10.653 . 
To calibrate the demand parameters involves making assumptions about the parameters 
(k,£,A) such that the benchmark prices and quantities are replicated, in addition to satisfying likely 
values of the demand elasticities involved. A possible difficulty in this context is that the parameters 
govern not only the own-price elasticities but also the cross-price elasticities (including elasticities of 
demand for GM food, a product that was not yet on the market in the benchmark year.) But our 
specification is particularly useful here, because we can deduce the behavior of the demand system 
from the value of a "total elasticity" that refers to aggregate food demand. To see this, define total 
demand as 
It can be verified that in our demand structure we have riT--s. Thus, the parameter £ is a 
measure of the elasticity of total food demand, which is known to be quite inelastic in developed 
countries (Tiffin and Tiffin, 1999; Moschini, 1998; Gracia, Gil, and Angulo, 1998). But here we also 
need to consider that in our model the demand is for EU-produced food (i.e., net of import and 
exports), and thus it is likely more elastic than the final EU demand for food. Given this likelihood, 
in the baseline solution we assume s = 0.4. Conditional on these elasticity values, the market 
clearing conditions in equations (24)-(25) (with the price of GM product set to the choke level pg ) 
are solved for the remaining two demand parameters, by using the demand functions from equations 
(14) and (15), to yield k = 238.7 (billion) and X = 0.989. 
DT{pb,pn , P g )^Db(pb,pn,pg) + Dn(pb,pn,pg) + Ds(pb,pn,pg) (29) 
Given this, we define the total demand elasticity as 
r (30) 
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5. Results 
Given our calibration procedure, solving the model for the pre-innovation equilibrium replicates 
observed price and quantity levels for the year 2000. Solving the model for the post-innovation 
equilibrium allows us to trace the main economic implications of the adoption of GM products in a 
setting characterized by differentiated consumer demand and the need for a segregation cost arising 
from the "externality" brought about by the introduction of the new GM crops. The economic effects 
that we focus on relate to the direction of price changes for traditional, organic, and GM products and 
the distribution of welfare effects across agents (consumers and producers). Specifically, in our 
model there are three welfare effects of interest. First, consumers are affected by the innovation, and 
thus we wish to compute the change in aggregate consumer surplus, ACS. Agricultural producers' 
welfare is also affected by the innovation. In particular, our model admits two distinct components of 
what is usually referred to as "producers' surplus" change, APS : a change in the return to land and a 
change in the return to efforts for producers of organic product. 
Consider first consumer welfare. Denote the pre-innovation and post-innovation equilibrium 
solutions with superscripts i = 0 and i-1, respectively, such that the pre- and post-equilibrium 
prices are written as (Pn,Pb<P°g) and(p ln,p\,p\) • It follows that the change in total consumers' 
As for producers' surplus, as mentioned earlier, our model admits two distinct components. Consider 
the return to efforts for organic food producers, labeled as R'b, ie {0,1}. Then in our model these 
returns satisfy 
surplus is 
Pb Pn Pg 
ACS = - \Db{pb,p°n,pl)dpb- jDn(pb,pn,p°g)dpn- \Dg{pb\p\,pg)dpg (31) 
ab o 
(32) 
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where MC lb  (z) = c • (1 + pz' ) + abn l  + sb . Performing the integration obtains 
' 2 %  
The other component of producers' surplus is the return to landowners at equilibria i e {0,1}, which 
satisfies V[ = nlL . Hence, the change in surplus accruing to landowners is AVL = (nx - 7t°)L and 
the change in surplus accruing to organic food producers is ARb = Rb - Rb , such that the total change 
in producer surplus is APS = ARb + A VL . Finally, total welfare change arising from the innovation is 
measured as AW - ACS + APS. 
5.1. Baseline scenario 
In the base scenario the model was solved with the calibrated parameters reported in Table 1. Note 
that the cost for labeling and traceability of GM food (over and above the cost of IP) here is set equal 
to zero (i.e., t = 0 ). Although there are likely minimal costs involved in labeling GM food per se, the 
record-keeping mandated by the traceability requirements on GM food are likely more onerous. Still, 
the benchmark of zero labeling and traceability costs is of some interest, especially if one wants to 
disentangle the effects of such activities from the actual segregation costs necessary to supply 
consumers with what they perceive as the superior products (conventional and organic food with IP), 
and therefore we begin our analysis with that assumption. We shall perform sensitivity analysis 
regarding this parameter value later. The other critical parameter is the segregation cost. In the 
baseline scenario we assume that conventional food and organic food face the same segregation costs, 
following the introduction of GM products, and thus (as per earlier discussion) we set sn - sb = 0.05. 
Results for the base scenario are reported in Table 2. With the introduction of GM food, the 
price of GM food declines relative to the pre-innovation choke price (recall that there is no demand 
for GM food for all pg > pn ), and this new product displaces mainly the conventional product 
(conventional food production decreases by 30.7 % and GM food production accounts for 30.4% of 
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total output in the new equilibrium). To interpret these and subsequent results it helps to note 
explicitly that the difference in equilibrium prices between conventional and GM products is 
determined by the supply side of the model, specifically pn- p*g = (1 - y)c + sn-t. Given this price 
difference, in turn, the demand side determines the relative share of GM and non-GM products on the 
market. Absent segregation costs, the introduction of a more efficient production (the GM product) 
would tend to increase the returns to land (the unit rent it ). But the existence of segregation costs 
puts a wedge between the demand prices and supply prices for the conventional and organic products 
and leads to a sizeable erosion to the returns to land (the fixed factor). At the demand level, the price 
of GM food of course decreases relative to the pre-innovation choke price level. The price of organic 
food decreases at the demand level (despite the need for segregation) because the production-cost 
impact of the decline in the rental price of land is much more important for this (land-extensive) 
sector. The price of conventional food, on the other hand, increases at the demand level (because the 
effect of segregation costs, which act like a tax, dominates). 
All producer prices decrease in the new equilibrium (which in turn accounts for why the unit 
rent value of land decreases). As for welfare effects, returns to land of course decline, but the non-
land returns to organic food producers increase. Overall, however, the returns to land obviously 
dominate, and producer surplus declines substantially. Consumer surplus also declines: given our 
parameterized preferences, the decline in the price of GM and organic food is not enough to 
compensate for the increase in conventional food price. Because both producers and consumers lose 
in the aggregate, the introduction of GM food in the EU agro-food system unambiguously decreases 
the total welfare by 7.7%. We should emphasize again that, unlike other studies in this area, in our 
calculation we do not account for the ex post returns to innovators that develop the GM crops.15 
15 One way to rationalize our procedure is to consider ex post returns to innovators as compensating, in 
expectation, for the R&D investments that made the innovation possible. An alternative argument for ignoring 
the potential returns to the R&D sector is presented in Demont, Wesseler, and Tollens (2004). 
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To further illustrate and qualify the foregoing results of the baseline scenarios, in what 
follows we carry out a sensitivity analysis, whereby the effects of changes in the value of some key 
parameters are explored. 
5.2. Effects of segregation cost for organic food 
In the baseline solution we postulated that segregation costs for conventional and organic food are 
equal, that is, sn =sb. But it is of interest to analyze the effects of two alternative polar situations. 
The first situation is the case that sb < sn. A justification for this scenario derives from the 
observation that organic products derive from well-specified production practices that inherently 
already include elements of identity preservation. Thus, one can hypothesize that there may be a 
smaller segregation cost for organic products, relative to conventional products, following the 
introduction of GM food. But the alternative of sb > sn is also quite relevant, because organic 
production insists on a zero-tolerance level for the adventitious presence of GM material. Meeting 
this stricter standard is, of course, bound to be costlier. 
The results concerning the various impact of segregation, labeling and traceability are 
reported in Table 3. The second column, in particular, computes the impact of the innovation if in 
fact all such costs were absent. However unrealistic, this scenario is useful as a benchmark. Note in 
particular that both producers and consumers overall would benefit from the GM innovation, so 
aggregate welfare increases. But the returns to organic producers would decrease in such a scenario 
because of the double impact of competition at the demand level (one more substitute product is 
available) and because of the increase in the returns to land (which causes production costs to 
increase for the organic industry proportionally more than in the other industries). 
To ascertain the potential impact of alternative scenarios for the cost of segregating organic 
food, the parameter sb is halved and doubled, respectively, while all other parameters are kept at their 
baseline values. The results are reported in the fourth and fifth columns, respectively, of Table 3. A 
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lower segregation cost for organic food leads to a lower equilibrium price for organic food as 
expected, whereas the equilibrium prices of other goods increase. The effect on the equilibrium 
quantity demanded is for organic food to increase (relative to the benchmark) and for the other two 
products to decrease, although the magnitude of these effects is somewhat small. Per hectare rent 
remains higher than at the baseline, which increases the cost of production so that prices for 
conventional and GM food are higher compared to the baseline. 
Both components of producer surplus increase relative to the baseline, whereas consumer 
surplus is actually lower than at the baseline (the additional decrease in organic food price does not 
offset the small price increases in the other two products). Overall, aggregate welfare is minimally 
improved (relative to the baseline). Doubling sb has essentially the opposite effect of halving it, and 
therefore the economic effects are qualitatively reversed relative to the baseline. 
5.3. Effects of the overall level of segregation costs 
As discussed in Section 3, a wide range of segregation costs have been contemplated in previous 
studies, and much uncertainty remains as to their actual level because large-scale segregation of GM 
and non-GM products has not yet been attempted. The parameter value for segregation cost used in 
the baseline reflects an average of values found in previous studies, but it is of course of interest to 
evaluate the model's sensitivity to changes in the level of segregation cost. To that end, here we 
maintain the baseline's assumption that segregation costs for organic and conventional products are 
the same (sn = sb ), and consider the effects of doubling and halving their level. The effects of former 
and latter scenarios relative to the baseline scenario can be seen by comparing the second (baseline) 
column with the sixth and seventh columns, respectively, in Table 3. 
None of the results qualitatively change relative to the pre-innovation scenario, the first 
column in Table 3. For higher segregation costs, the equilibrium producers' prices are uniformly 
lower than at the baseline; at the demand level the only price that increases (relative to the baseline) is 
that of conventional food (the largest industry here). The production of quality food and of GM food 
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both expand, whereas the production of conventional food decreases relative to the baseline. The gain 
of consumers due to the decrease in the prices of GM and quality food does not outweigh their losses 
due to the increase in the price of conventional food, and consumers are (as expected) negatively 
impacted by the larger segregation costs. Organic food producers' returns increase, as does their 
supply, but overall the higher segregation costs hurt producers, consumers, and aggregate welfare. 
Halving the segregation costs works just the opposite of doubling them, so the results are 
qualitatively reversed relative to the baseline case. In particular, both GM and organic food 
production decrease (relative to the baseline). Overall welfare is improved but organic producers 
actually prefer uniformly higher segregation costs. 
5.4. Effects of GM labeling and traceability costs 
Labeling and traceability costs of GM food is envisioned by the current regulation in the EU, which 
requires that the GM content of the food must be traced back at all stages of production. This 
requirement clearly increases the costs of marketing GM products while it arguably does not affect 
the IP costs of non-GM products (which still have to undertake all the many IP activities that are 
required to ensure segregation at the desired purity level). In the baseline, we set the labeling and 
traceability costs to zero in order to disentangle their effects from those of segregation costs, which 
are necessary to preserve the identity of conventional and quality food. 
We do sensitivity analysis by allowing this parameter to take positive values, such as one-
fourth and one-half of the segregation cost for conventional food, which are presented in the last two 
columns in Table 3. The positive labeling and traceability costs, over and above segregation costs, 
have a direct negative impact on the supply price of GM food, which in turn tends to decrease the 
returns to land. The latter affects the unit production costs so that in equilibrium the demand prices of 
conventional and organic food are also lower (but the price of GM food is higher owing to the tax­
like effect of the GM labeling and traceability requirements). The returns to producers of quality food 
are improved by labeling and traceability costs imposed on GM producers, compared to the baseline. 
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But the organic industry is small, and for the overall producer surplus the further drop in the returns to 
land tends to dominate. Consumer surplus is actually improved by positive labeling and traceability 
costs, because consumers can enjoy the lower equilibrium prices of conventional and organic 
products. Overall aggregate welfare, however, is negatively impacted (producers lose more than 
consumers gain). 
5.5. Effects of the size of GM innovation 
The parameter (y) for cost reduction due to GM technology indexes the farmers' net benefit from 
adopting GM innovation. The value used in the baseline is the average of the values suggested in the 
literature. We now perform sensitivity analysis on this parameter by considering y = 0.99 and 
y = 0.97 (recall that the baseline had y = 0.98 ). Results are reported in the third and fourth columns 
in Table 4 (the baseline is in the second column). 
Generally speaking, it seems that the results concerning the impact of the size of the GM 
innovation do not change the qualitative insights obtained in the baseline. For a lower value of the y 
parameter, the cost reduction from GM innovation becomes higher and GM production slightly 
expands. The opposite attains for the higher value of the y parameter. The qualitative effects on 
prices are intuitive. As for the quantitative impacts on welfare, a larger GM innovation improves 
overall welfare and returns to land, relative to the baseline, but decreases consumer surplus and the 
returns to organic producers. 
5.6. Effects of demand elasticity 
The total elasticity value for aggregate food demand is found to be quite inelastic in the literature. 
Because we model the EU food demand as net of imports/exports, we assumed somewhat more 
elastic demand and set s = 0.4 in the calibration stage. This parameter value governs the flexibility of 
aggregate demand as prices uniformly vary and can be important for the model's results. GM food 
innovation creates price changes in all markets: once its production becomes feasible, it will be a less 
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expensive alternative to other products. At the same time, GM food production creates negative 
externality on other goods because they need to be segregated, which increases their production costs 
and pushes their prices up. 
We halve and double the baseline value of total elasticity demand and report the results in the 
last two columns of Table 4, respectively, which can be compared with the baseline scenario in the 
second column. Once again, none of the results qualitatively change in these scenarios relative to the 
pre-innovation scenario shown in the first column. Overall, therefore, we should conclude that the 
qualitative conclusions of the baseline are robust to the choice of the demand elasticity value. 
5.7. Effects of the parameter <f) (the size of the population of indifferent consumers) 
Our baseline solution assumes that 25% of EU consumers are, essentially, indifferent to the GM 
nature of food produced from GM crops; as long as in equilibrium the new product commands a 
lower price (no matter how small the difference), these consumers would consume the new product. 
As discussed earlier, this parameterization captures an important attribute of the demand impact of the 
introduction of the new, weakly inferior GM products. But how important is the actual size of the 
parameter <p for our conclusions? Table 5 provides some sensitivity analysis that considers various 
alternative values for this parameter. 
Beginning with the last column, the case of <j> = 1 considers a scenario in which all consumers 
are indifferent between GM and conventional food. In such a case the GM food completely supplants 
the pre-existing non-GM conventional food. This scenario would be associated with an increase in 
the returns to land (which would capture most of the efficiency gains of the innovation), but 
consumers also gain and there is a sizeable overall welfare gain. The losers in such a setting would 
be the organic food producers, for three reasons: because the increased returns to land increase their 
production costs; because the competing product at the demand level is available at a slightly lower 
price; and because they still have to incur segregation costs to market their non-GM organic product 
to consumers. 
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Decreasing the parameter <f> (i.e., more and more consumers "dislike" the GM innovation) 
decreases overall welfare, returns to land, and consumer surplus monotonically. But organic 
producers prefer a lower (f> because that means that consumers are more attracted to their product 
(ceteris paribus) and because they can benefit from the reduced rental price of land. 
5.8. Some break-even points 
To sharpen the model's prediction on the potential quantitative impacts of GM product adoption on 
EU agriculture and welfare, following the valuable suggestion of a reviewer, in Table 6 we report 
some "break-even" points of particular interest. Consider first the "size" of the innovation captured 
by the parameter y . As is apparent by now, our model displays one of the insights formalized in 
Lapan and Moschini (2004): there is a market failure associated with the mere introduction of the new 
product which has a negative impact on welfare. Indeed, our baseline solution indicates that overall 
welfare in the EU would drop as a result of GM crop adoption, mostly because of the need for 
(hitherto unnecessary) segregation costs. But, as the foregoing analysis indicates, the marginal 
impact of the innovation may be positive (because the "externality effect" is associated with the 
presence of the new GM activity, and not to its level, the market failure is essentially that of a 
nonconvexity). So, is there a size of the innovation large enough to fully offset the aggregate 
negative welfare effects of the GM innovation? The answer is yes, in our model. But, as the third 
column in Table 6 indicates, the parameter y would have to be extraordinarily low: y - 0.877. That 
is, GM crop production would need to entail an efficiency gain exceeding 12%. Even at that, 
however, the break-even of aggregate welfare would be achieved at the expense of consumers and of 
organic food producers (both of these groups would lose). 
Next, we consider the impact of segregation costs. How low would they need to be, given 
our other baseline parameters, for aggregate welfare not to decrease? Very low indeed, in our model, 
as indicated in the fourth column of Table 6. Specifically, we would need sb = =0.0062 ; i.e., 
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segregation costs would need to account for less than 1% of the supply price. Finally, we consider 
the break-even point for the parameter (f> indexing the size of the population of "indifferent" 
consumers. It turns out that ^ = 0.73 would do. This is much higher than our (conservative) baseline 
choice but perhaps not outside of the set of likely values. The truth of the matter is that little is 
known about the quantitative attributes of consumer response to GM attributes in food. Our analysis 
here again emphasizes the crucial importance that such preferences have on the calculation of 
possible market and welfare effects. 
6. Conclusion 
We have developed a partial equilibrium, multi-market model of the European agricultural sector, in 
which conventional food and quality-enhanced food (organic) exist prior to the introduction of GM 
products and may be differentially affected by this innovation. Whereas the model is rather stylized, it 
possesses some distinctive features: on the demand side, consumers have differentiated tastes with 
respect to these three products; on the supply side, we explicitly take into account the IP costs that 
GM food would impose on other goods in the equilibrium. For the organic food, we model "quality 
enhancement" as resulting from additional efforts supplied by producers. We endogenize the reward 
to these efforts and the price of land. The calibrated model is solved for equilibrium prices, quantities, 
and welfare changes. Finally, we carry out some sensitivity analysis on the assumed values of key 
parameters. 
The results show that the introduction of GM products in this context reduces welfare, as well 
as both consumers' and producers' surplus. This conclusion differs from those of existing empirical 
studies, which have found a positive welfare impact of the new GM technology (e.g., Falck-Zepeda, 
Traxler, and Nelson, 2000; Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky, 2000; Demont and Tollens, 2004), but 
it is in keeping with the analyses of Lapan and Moschini (2004) and Fulton and Giannakas (2004). 
There are at least four reasons why our results differ from the positive welfare effects found in some 
77 
earlier studies. First, here we explicitly allow for differentiated consumer preferences, specifically for 
some consumers to have a preference for non-GM products. Second, in this model we have also 
assumed that it is costlier to provide non-GM products in the post-GM situation because of the need 
for identity preservation activities. Both of these features, ignored by the aforementioned previous 
studies, appear quite relevant, and their explicit consideration should improve our assessment of the 
economic impact of the new GM technology. Third, in this study we have also neglected the ex post 
returns to the providers of the GM innovation, for reasons discussed earlier.16 Finally, our model 
explicitly models the multi-market effects of GM adoption and specifically accounts for the 
endogeneity of the returns to agriculture's foremost fixed input, land. 
An important attribute of the GM product innovation effects highlighted by our model is the 
distinction between the total and marginal impact of GM innovation adoption. Such a distinction 
derives from the fact that we have modelled a market failure associated with the per se introduction of 
the (otherwise efficiency-enhancing) innovation. Introducing GM products entails some drastic 
adjustments for the agricultural sector, and hitherto unnecessary segregation activities (a real resource 
cost) are now necessary, which tends to decrease aggregate welfare. But given that GM products are 
introduced, ceteris paribus it may be desirable to have a larger rather than smaller diffusion of the 
product. For instance, the labelling and traceability requirements of GM products, which act as a 
disincentive to the (marginal) adoption of GM products, here further decrease aggregate welfare. 
Another conclusion of our analysis is that the introduction of GM products actually benefits 
the producers of the "quality" product (organic food in our specification). Such a conclusion, of 
course, is bound to depend on possible differences in segregation costs for the two non-GM products. 
Insisting on a zero tolerance level for the adventitious presence of GM content in organic food, for 
16 If we were interested in evaluating the ex post welfare effects of a given (available) innovation, it would 
possibly be desirable to account for such returns to the providers of the innovation, and that could clearly 
change the overall welfare picture. On the other hand, if the focus in on EU welfare, a relevant observation is 
that the current GM traits are mostly owned by companies located outside the EU. Indeed, some have 
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example, presumably requires costlier segregation activities, and that will hurt organic producers. We 
also show that the new EU labeling and traceability requirements do decrease the market share of GM 
food, to some extent, and hurt the overall returns to farmers but actually have a slightly positive 
impact on the welfare of consumers (through the decrease of production costs due to lower land 
rents). 
One of the main contributions of this paper is the derivation of a model that allows for a 
differentiated food demand, induced by the innovation itself, which appears to be an important feature 
of the current generation of GM innovations. We have also shown that such an induced differentiated 
demand structure can be embedded in a standard equilibrium model for the agricultural sector that is 
suitable for welfare analysis. The results of this study are qualitatively interesting, but the actual 
magnitude of the market and welfare impact uncovered obviously depends on the necessarily 
simplified structure of the model, as well as on the actual parametric calibration that was 
implemented. The sensitivity analysis carried out provides some comfort as to the robustness of the 
results presented, but of course much scope remains for future work devoted to a more exact 
accounting of the many (sometimes unexpected) impacts that modern biotechnology is having on the 
agricultural sector. 
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Table 1- Parameters implemented in the base run 
Description Unit of 
measure 
Values 
Primary 
Data 
V T  
n 
Total value of production 
Value of organic food production 
Total UAA in the EU 
Land allocated to organic food 
Rent 
b€ (a) 
mh (b) 
mh 
e/ha 
248.5 
2.79 
130.3 
3.78 
208.8 
Calculated 
P n  
P b  
L n  =  L ~ L b  
l /e„=V4, 
x b  = Vb/ P b  
1/ab - xb/Lb 
c  
=  P n ~ a n n  
z = L b  /  L  
Price of normal food 
Price of organic food (price index) 
Value of normal food production 
Normal food production 
Land allocated to normal food 
Yield for normal food production 
Organic food production 
Yield for organic food production 
Unit cost of market input bundle 
Fraction of total land allocated to the 
organic production 
€ / u  
e/u 
b€ 
bu (d) 
mh 
u/ha 
bu 
u/ha 
€ / u  
1.00 
1.63 
245.7 
245.7 
126.6 
1,941 
1.71 
452 
0.89 
0.029 
Assumed and 
calibrated 
£  
P  
Segregation cost for normal food 
Segregation cost for organic food 
Reduction in average cost of producing 
GM food with respect to normal food 
Labeling costs, traceability, and other 
mandatory costs for producing GM food 
The share of consumers who are 
indifferent between normal and GM food 
at the same prices 
Total demand elasticity 
Organic production parameter 
€./u (c) 
€/m 
€ / u  
0.05 
0.05 
0.98 
0 
0.25 
0.40 
10.65 
<a) billion euros 
(b) million hectares 
(c) euros per unit of production ( u )  
(d) billion of units of production 
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Table 2 - Baseline scenario results 
(Note: See Table 1 for the values of parameters implemented ) 
Variable U.M. 
Values Variation 
Pre-
innovation 
Post-
innovation 
Level % 
Demand prices 
normal food ( p n )  €/w 1.00 1.026 0.026 2.55 
organic food ( p b )  €/w 1.63 1.584 -0.046 -2.83 
GM food ( pg ) 
€/w >1.00 0.958 -0.055 -5.44 
Producer prices 
normal food ( p n - s n )  €/M 1.00 0.976 -0.024 -2.45 
organic food ( pb-sb ) €/w 1.63 1.534 -0.096 -5.90 
GM food ( pg -1 ) e/u >1.00 0.958 -0.055 -5.44 
Food Production 
normal food ( xn ) bu a 245.71 170.31 -75.41 -30.69 
organic food ( xb ) bu 1.71 1.77 0.06 3.30 
GM food ( x g )  bu 0.00 75.17 75.17 NA 
Total segregation costs b€ 0.00 8.60 8.60 NA 
Unit rent for land ( n ) e/ha 208.79 161.24 -47.55 -22.78 
Total Rent be c 27.21 21.02 -6.20 -22.78 
Profits of organic producers me d 235.57 251.35 15.78 6.70 
Producers' surplus be 27.45 21.27 -6.18 -22.52 
Consumers' surplus be -1.55 
Aggregate welfare be -7.73 
a Billion units 
b Million hectares 
c Billion Euros 
d Million Euros 
Table 3: Results for the simulations on segregation and labeling costs 
Pre-in-
nova-
tion 
Post-innovation 
Zero 
Seg­
regation 
costs 
Baseline 
solution 
Different segregation 
costs for organic and 
conventional 
Different levels of 
same segregation 
costs 
Labeling and traceability 
costs 
Variable U.M 
o
 
o
 
Il 
II Il 
II 
Co
 
Co
 
sb = 0.55 s t  
S
„
= B  S r ,  
Il 
II 
%
 K
 
sb = 0.5 B 
s„ = 0.5 B J. =24 
S b  = S n = B  
t = sn/4 
S b = S n = B  
t = sn/2 
Consumer prices 
normal food ( pn ) e/u 1.00 1.0044 1.0255 1.0262 1.0241 1.0141 1.0530 1.0208 1.0165 
organic food ( pb ) e/u 1.63 1.6460 1.5839 1.5655 1.6211 1.6117 1.5463 1.5666 1.5509 
GM food ( pg ) e/w >1.00 0.9865 0.9577 0.9584 0.9563 0.9713 0.9352 0.9654 0.9736 
Producer prices 
normal food (p n — S n )  e/u 1.00 1.0044 0.9755 0.9762 0.9741 0.9891 0.9530 0.9708 0.9665 
organic food (P / , — S b )  e /u 1.63 1.6460 1.5339 1.5405 1.5211 1.5867 1.4463 1.5166 1.5009 
GM food ( P g  —  t )  e/u >1.00 0.9865 0.9577 0.9584 0.9563 0.9713 0.9352 0.9529 0.9486 
Normal food production ( Xn ) bub 245.71 180.70 170.31 170.25 170.41 175.48 160.20 172.80 175.29 
Organic food production ( Xb ) bu 1.71 1.69 1.77 1.79 1.72 1.73 1.82 1.78 1.80 
GM food production ( xg ) bu 0.00 65.08 75.17 75.13 75.24 70.14 85.04 72.60 70.03 
Segregation and labeling costs be 0.00 0.00 8.60 8.56 8.69 4.43 16.20 9.64 10.61 
Unit rent for land ( K ) 
€/ha 208.79 217.26 161.24 162.65 158.52 187.64 117.64 152.07 143.71 
Total Rent be d 27.21 28.32 21.02 21.20 20.66 24.46 15.33 19.82 18.73 
Profits of organic producers m € t  235.57 230.97 251.35 257.48 239.61 241.65 267.15 256.61 261.59 
Producers' surplus be 27.45 28.55 21.27 21.46 20.90 24.70 15.60 20.08 18.99 
Variation in consumers' he 
surplus - 0.03 -1.55 -1.69 -1.27 -0.61 -4.23 -1.28 -1.09 
Variation in aggregate welfare be 
-
1.13 -7.73 -7.69 -7.82 -3.37 -16.08 -8.66 -9.55 
Notes: (a) B = Base Value; (b) Billion units; (c) Million of hectars; (d) Billion of euros; (e) Million of euros. 
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis on parameter for cost reduction due to GM technology ( 7 )  and total elasticity value ( s  )  
Pre- Post-innovation 
innovation 
Baseline Effect of size of Effect of demand 
solution innovation (parameter 7  )  elasticity (parameter s  )  
s  = 0.4 g = 0.4 £ = 0.4 £ = 0.2 £ - 0.8 
Variable U.M 7  = 0.98 7  = 0.97 7 = 0.99 7  = 0.98 7 = 0.98 
Consumer prices 
normal food ( pn ) e/u 1.00 1.0255 1.0291 1.0221 1.0304 1.0229 
organic food ( pb ) E/U 1.63 1.5839 1.5972 1.5714 1.6031 1.5738 
GM food ( p g )  
€ / u  >1.00 0.9577 0.9524 0.9632 0.9626 0.9551 
Producer prices 
normal food ( p n - s n )  €./u 1.00 0.9755 0.9791 0.9721 0.9804 0.9729 
organic food ( p b  ~  s h  )  €/w 1.63 1.5339 1.5472 1.5214 1.5531 1.5238 
GM food ( p g - t  )  e/ u  >1.00 0.9577 0.9524 0.9632 0.9626 0.9551 
Normal food production ( x n )  b u  h 245.71 170.31 168.54 172.08 171.05 168.95 
Organic food production ( x b  )  b u  1.71 1.77 1.75 1.78 1.75 1.77 
GM food production ( x g  )  b u  0.00 75.17 77.00 73.33 74.47 76.50 
Total segregation costs be 0.00 8.60 8.51 8.69 8.64 8.54 
Unit rent for land ( K ) e/ha 208.79 161.24 168.27 154.61 170.78 156.22 
Total Rent be c 27.21 21.02 21.93 20.15 22.26 20.36 
Profits of organic food producers me a 235.57 251.35 247.45 255.13 247.98 253.05 
Producers' surplus be 27.45 21.27 22.18 20.41 22.51 20.62 
Variation in consumers' surplus be -1.55 -1.78 -1.35 -2.81 -0.85 
Variation in aggregate welfare be -7.73 -7.05 -8.39 -7.76 -7.69 
Notes: 'a) B  -  Base Value; ® Billion; (c) Million of hectars; (d' Billion of euros; <c) Million of euros. 
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis on parameter <j> (size of the population of indifferent consumers) 
Post-innovation 
Pré- Baseline Effect of size of indifferent consumers (parameter 
innovation solution <!>) 
Variable U.M 
</> = 0.25 4 = 0.125 0 = 0.5 = 0.75 </> = 1 
Consumer prices 
normal food ( pn ) e/u 1.00 1.0255 1.0189 1.0387 1.0517 1.0646 
organic food ( pb ) €/w 1.63 1.5839 1.5600 1.6316 1.6793 1.7268 
GM food ( p g )  e/u >1.00 0.9577 0.9510 0.9708 0.9838 0.9967 
Producer prices 
normal food ( pn - s n) e/u 1.00 0.9755 0.9689 0.9887 1.0017 1.0146 
organic food ( ph - sb ) e/u 1.63 1.5339 1.5100 1.5816 1.6293 1.6768 
GM food (p g — t ) e/u >1.00 0.9577 0.9510 0.9708 0.9838 0.9967 
Normal food production ( xn ) bu a 245.71 170.31 199.10 113.07 56.31 0.00 
Organic food production ( xb ) bu 1.71 1.77 1.79 1.71 1.66 1.61 
GM food production ( xg ) bu 0.00 75.17 46.25 132.63 189.62 246.14 
Total segregation costs be 0.00 8.60 10.04 5.74 2.90 0.08 
Unit rent for land ( n ) e/ha 
be c 208.79 161.24 148.36 186.79 212.08 237.12 Total Rent 27.21 21.02 19.34 24.35 27.64 30.91 
Profits of organic food producers me d 235.57 251.35 259.54 236.05 222.06 209.25 
Producers' surplus be 27.45 21.27 19.60 24.58 27.86 31.11 
Variation in consumers' surplus be -1.55 -1.90 -0.83 -0.10 0.64 
Variation in aggregate welfare be -7.73 -9.75 -3.70 0.31 4.31 
Notes: (a) Billion units; (b> Million of hectars; (c) Billion of euros; <d) Million of euros 
Table 6: Break-Even Analysis 
Variable U.M 
Pre-
innovation 
Post-innovation 
Baseline 
solution 
Break-even value of given parameter 
(all other parameters held at baseline value) 
7 = 0.8774 sb = sn =0.0062 <!> = 0.7305 
Consumer prices 
normal food ( pn ) € / u  1.00 1.0255 1.0723 1.0066 1.0507 
organic food ( p b )  e/u 1.63 1.5839 1.7592 1.6369 1.6755 
GM food ( p g )  e/u >1.00 0.9577 0.9130 0.9826 0.9828 
Producer prices 
normal food ( pn - s„ ) e/u 1.00 0.9755 1.0223 1.0004 1.0007 
organic food ( pb~sb ) e/u 1.63 1.5339 1.7092 1.6307 1.6255 
GM food (P g — t )  e/u >1.00 0.9577 0.9130 0.9826 0.9828 
Normal food production ( xn ) bu a 245.71 170.31 152.58 179.40 60.72 
Organic food production ( x b )  bu 1.71 1.77 1.60 1.70 1.66 
GM food production ( xg ) bu 0.00 75.17 93.58 66.34 185.19 
Total segregation costs be 0.00 8.60 7.71 1.13 3.12 
Unit rent for land ( n ) e/ha 208.79 161.24 252.18 209.59 210.12 
Total Rent be c 27.21 21.02 32.87 27.32 27.39 
Profits of organic food producers me a 235.57 251.35 207.77 233.70 223.11 
Producers' surplus be 27.45 21.27 33.08 27.55 27.61 
Variation in consumers' surplus be -1.55 -5.63 -0.10 -0.16 
Variation in aggregate welfare be -7.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: (a) B = Base Value; <b) billion units ,c) Million of hectars; (d> Billion of euros; <e) Million of euros. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
A. 1. On the value of quality food production (v6) and price of quality food ( P b )  
Hamm, Fricderike, and Darren (2002) provides country and product based data on the production of 
organic food, price of organic food, price premium for organic food in European Union (EU) in year 
2000. Moreover, EU DG of Agriculture (2003) provides country and product based data on prices and 
production levels for an extensive set of products of agricultural market in EU including year 2000. 
Because the latter data refer to both organic and conventional food, we can only calculate the value 
and the level of total production on a product and country base. Combining both sources of data, we 
estimate the prices and production levels for conventional food on various goods and present in Table 
A.l. 
Note that Hamm, Friederike, and Darren (2002) reports the organic production levels but not 
the prices and price premiums at the farm level for vegetables, fruits, and olives. Because the 
combined market share of these groups is significant in the organic sector (ITC, 2001), we want to 
exploit the quantity data provided on these groups in Hamm, Friederike, and Darren (2002). 
Regarding olives, we presume that Hamm, Friederike, and Darren (2002) reports for table 
olives given the large size of the production they reported, which corresponds to the 10% of the EU 
olive oil production (EU DG for agriculture, 2003). Note that the EU data for olive oil include table 
olives in olive oil equivalent (EC DG for agriculture, 2003). Similarly, we find the olive oil 
equivalent of table olives in Hamm, Friederike, and Darren (2002) based on the measure that on 
average it takes 5 kg olives to produce 1 liter (corresponds to 1kg in terms of mass) olive oil and 
report on Table A. 1,17 
The levels of total production on a country basis are available for vegetables and fruits in EU 
DG for Agriculture (2003), and for olive oil in EC DG for Agriculture (2002). Note that the former 
17 Based on the text written by Executive Secretariat of the International Olive Oil Council (IOOC) on 
the Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associations (FOSFA)'s webpage, which is available at: 
http://www.fosfa.org/resources/res_seeds_complete.pdf 
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source reports on the total production only at EU level for olive oil, which is consistent with the latter 
source, nevertheless, the prices for olive oil types on a country basis are available in EU DG for 
Agriculture (2003). Based on the available data on prices of a set of products belonging to each 
group, we calculate an average price for each group for a given country.18 Using this average price 
and the total production, we calculate the value of production for each group in a given country. 
Furthermore, we make the assumption that the price premium for vegetables, fruits, and olive oil is 
the same with the average price premium on remaining organic products in a given country. 
Combining the estimated value of production, total production and price premium with the organic 
production reported in Hamm, Friederike, and Darren (2002), we can calculate the prices for organic 
and conventional food and quantities of conventional food for each group in a given country. Then, 
the weighted EU average for organic and conventional prices for each group is calculated in a similar 
manner with Hamm, Friederike, and Darren (2002) and reported in Table A. 1. 
Based on the data in Table A.l, the value of quality food production and the Fisher price 
index can be calculated as vb - 2,785,390,786 euros, and Pb = 1.63 , respectively. 
A.2. References: 
European Commision (EC) Directorate-General for Agriculture. 2002. The Olive Oil Sector in the 
European Union, available on the World Wide Web at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/publi/fact/oliveoil/2003_en.pdf. 
EU Directorate-General for Agriculture. 2003. Agriculture in the European Union-Statistical and 
Economic Information 2002, available on the World Wide Web at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/agrista/2002/table_en/en31 .htm. 
18 It is the weighted average for vegetables, (where the weights are the share of value of each product 
within the value of set of products considered for this group), the weighted average of the 
arithmetically averaged prices for fruit categories, citrus fruits and non-citrus fruits based on the 
distinction in EU DG for Agriculture (2003), (where the weights are the share of value of each fruit 
category within total value of fruit production), and the arithmetic average for olive oil. Note that the 
products for which prices are available on a country basis are cauliflowers, tomatoes, and aubergines 
for vegetables; oranges, mandarins, lemons, celementines and satsumas for citrus fruit, and apples, 
pears, peaches, nectarines, apricots, table grapes, water melons, melons, and strawberries for non-
citrus fruit; and extra virgin olive oil, lampante grade olive oil 3°, and refined olive oil for olive oil. 
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Hamm, U., G. Friederike, and H. Darren. 2002. Analysis of the European market for organic food, 
OMIaRD, vol. 1, School of Management and Business, Aberystwyth, University of Wales. 
International Trade Center (ITC), 2001. World markets for Organic Fruit and Vegetables, available at 
http://www.intracen.org/mds/sectors/organic/welcome.htm 
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Table A.l 
Prices, (€/100kg or specified) 
Quantities produced (tonnes or specified) at farm gate level, 2000 
Products Pba Pnb q/ qnb 
Cereals 24 12 1,527,095 212,245,636 
Potatoes 32 11 298,998 48,292,917 
Oilseeds 33 17 43,678 14,046,332 
Wine0 97 76 1,229,999 177,662,001 
Milk 37 31 1,125,225 119,842,775 
Beef 303 286 47,367 7,193,633 
Sheep 444 360 5,691 1,137,537 
Pork 225 128 31,217 17,545,335 
Poultry 252 113 12,447 8,793,353 
Eggs' 0.150 0.063 999 82,120 
Vegetables6 137 63 570,563 54,357,798 
Fruits6 76 52 562,842 33,365,151 
Olive oil6'f 277 187 50,589 2,001,157 
a Source: Hamm, Friederike, and Darren (2002) or specified. 
Note: the organic production corresponds to the organic production sold as organic. 
See Hamm, Friederike, and Darren (2002) for the distinction. 
b Estimates based on Hamm, Friederike, and Darren (2002) and EU DG of Agriculture, 2003 
c Price G/hl, quantities in hi 
d Price G/piece, quantities in million pieces 
c Organic prices are estimates 
^Organic quantity is equivalent of that for table olives reported in Hamm, Friederike, and Darren (2002) 
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CHAPTER 4. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LICENSING RENTS OF U.S. 
UNIVERSITIES 
Abstract 
Since the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 made it possible for universities and other non-profit organizations 
to retain title to patents derived from federally funded research, there has been a dramatic surge in 
patenting by U.S. universities. This time period was also characterized by fundamental legal and 
institutional changes favoring stronger intellectual property rights. This growth in university patenting 
and licensing activities has resulted in a considerable debate on how these activities have affected the 
traditional role of universities (advancement of science and dissemination of knowledge) and on 
whether the Bayh-Dole Act was in fact necessary to promote technology transfer. This paper aims to 
contribute to this discussion by empirically studying a basic yet somewhat unexplored question: 
"What can universities expect in terms of economic returns from patenting and licensing activities?". 
1. Introduction 
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 made it possible for universities and other non-profit organizations to 
retain title to patents derived from federally funded research. The establishment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, which strengthened patent protection, and U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions in 1980 (e.g. Diamond vs. Chakrabarty and Diamond vs. Diehr), which led the way to 
the patenting of organisms, molecules and research techniques in biotechnology and allowed for the 
patentability of applications of laws of nature and mathematical formulae, respectively), were also 
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very important policy developments. Contemporaneous with these policy shifts in favor of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs), more and more universities became directly involved in licensing activities 
through their own technology transfer offices (TTO). The number of universities with a technology 
transfers office increased from 25 in 1980 to 200 in 1990, and by 2000 almost all U.S. universities 
had such an office (Nelson, 2001). Moreover, the growth of U.S. universities' patenting and licensing 
activities, which began in the 1970s, accelerated in the last decade (Sampat, 2003). A 15-fold increase 
in university patenting and a dramatic increase (more than 5-fold) in the number of universities 
granted patents were observed between 1965 and 1992 (Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1998). For 
69 U.S. universities, that are nine-year recurrent respondents to Association of the University 
Technology Managers (AUTM) surveys, U.S. patents issued to these universities increased 129% 
between 1993 and 2001. Licenses and options executed by 55 U.S. universities, that are eleven-year 
recurrent respondents to AUTM surveys, increased 139% between 1991 and 2001. The gross license 
revenue received by 56 universities that are eleven-year recurrent respondents to AUTM surveys 
increased 485% between 1991 and 2001. The total number of licenses and options executed by 156 
U.S. universities was 3,739 in FY 2002, which generated nearly $1 billion in that year as gross license 
revenue (AUTM 2002). 
This growth in university patenting and licensing activities created a recent discussion in the 
literature (Sampat, 2003, Link, Scott and Siegel, 2003, Nelson, 2001, Mowery et al., 2001, Jaffe, 
2000) that has revolved around how these activities have affected the traditional role of universities, 
typically understood to be the advancement of science and the dissemination of knowledge, and 
whether Bayh-Dole was necessary to induce the technology transfer and provided the right incentives 
for universities. The consensus is that Bayh-Dole created a favorable normative environment where 
universities can be active on the business side of their research. At the same time, it created incentives 
to generate economic returns from academic research, which is thought to be open to exploitation. 
Universities can do these activities based on their self interest, rather than public interest, which may 
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diverge to some degree. Although the Act was intended for inventions that would not be developed 
and commercialized without patenting and licensing, universities can exploit these rights by applying 
them to all patentable inventions. There are examples, such as the Cohen-Bayer recombinant DNA 
technique licensed by University of California and Stanford University and Richard Axel's co-
transformation process patented and licensed by Columbia University, for which technology transfer 
would occur absent patenting and licensing, and by doing so universities simply taxed the industry 
and eventually consumers (Sampat, 2003). Furthermore, how the other channels of disseminating 
knowledge and technology transfer, such as publications and conferences, are affected from the 
growth in the patenting and licensing activities is not known yet. Scientific research may suffer from 
restricted availability of, and access to, information and materials and research tools, which are inputs 
to further research. Universities may change their composition of patenting towards basic science, 
which may reduce the optimal use of knowledge, depending on the licensing arrangements. 
Moreover, the perception of universities as service organizations may be jeopardized. For instance, 
increasing patenting and licensing activities and resulting litigations, may create tension between 
industry and universities because some firms think that the competition is unfair as universities are 
supposed to be non-profit organizations and are publicly subsidized (Nelson, 2001). 
Because increased revenue is one of the considerations motivating universities in this context, 
a relevant question may be whether universities are collecting considerable net revenue from these 
activities. Figure 1 presents the distribution of net license revenues (license revenues received net of 
legal fees paid, but without taking into account the operating cost of technology transfer offices) for 
173 US universities, averaged over the five-year period 1998 to 2002. The observations are ranked in 
descending order, which makes it apparent that only a few universities are earning large revenues. In 
fact, the top 20 of universities in terms of net license revenue are obtaining 76% of the total positive 
net license revenue generated. It is apparent that the majority of universities either earn negative 
profit or break even. It is perhaps more informative, if the net license revenues are normalized by the 
94 
research expenditures. Figure 2 presents the distribution the net license revenues normalized by the 
research dollars, which is also skewed to the right. For a few universities this ratio is high, but for the 
majority of them (84%) it is less than 3%. Note also that the big revenue earners in Figure 1 are not 
necessarily those with high ratios in Figure 2. For example, the University of California System has 
the second largest net license revenue but that is only 3% of its total research budget. Moreover, 
Columbia University earns the highest net license revenue ($111 million), whereas Florida State 
University is receiving the highest gross revenue relative to its research budget (42%). 
Nevertheless, the overall picture shows that a few universities are earning large revenues, 
whereas others are continuing on these activities even though they appear to earn negative net 
revenues or break even at best. One can claim that universities have motives other than earning 
positive net revenues, such as to serve the faculty in commercializing their inventions and/or promote 
local economic development through technology transfer. However, one can not claim that those 
universities with large revenues do not have such motives. Furthermore, universities can have official 
long-term objectives targeting public goods but the managers of TTO as agents can have short-term 
horizon and give priority to monetary returns in their activities. In fact, based on a recent survey of 76 
major US universities, the licensing income generated is found to be the most important criterion by 
which TTO offices measure their success (Thursby, Jensen and Thursby, 2001). Moreover, in a 
theoretical study, Beath, et al. (2003) considered the possibility that universities, with tight budgets, 
could provide incentives to faculty to engage in applied research and consulting, which can augment 
the inventors' income and relax the university's budget. 
Therefore, one can hypothesize as well that, as long as there are examples of big winners 
among universities, others (especially those entered to these activities recently) can anticipate the 
potential for generating extra revenue to help with their budget and expect to be successful in the 
future. In other words, the reason that a majority of universities are continuing with these activities 
even though they appear to incur economic losses could be that they are earning economic rent in 
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expectation. Therefore we want to ask: what can U.S. universities expect in terms of economic returns 
from patenting and licensing activities? This question is basic and yet somewhat unexplored and 
motivates our study. In the next section we review some related studies that looked at the licensing 
revenues of US universities. 
2. Literature Review 
Trune (1996) analyzed the licensing activities of U.S. universities with the purpose of developing a 
"national criterion" with which universities can measure their performance. He mainly used data from 
AUTM licensing surveys between fiscal years 1991 and 1994, and other sources for university 
characteristics. He categorized the universities based on their differences regarding the research and 
teaching priorities, research emphasizes, research budgets and other factors. He calculated mean 
performance measures on some licensing activities for each group and found dramatic differences 
between groups. He also carried out some regression analysis for the whole sample of universities and 
for each group, a procedure which we think has shortcomings. For instance, he regressed the "license 
income received" on "number of active licenses" and "licenses generating royalties", both of which 
turned out to be significant and some other variables, which turned out to be insignificant. First, it is 
not surprising that license income can be explained by number of active licenses if there is no cost 
consideration. Second, licenses generating royalties are a subset of number of active licenses; 
therefore, having both of them in the regression is not meaningful. He argued that the reason that 
insignificant variables turned out to be so was the other significant variables in the regression and 
dropped the insignificant variables from the regression. In conclusion, Trune (1996) simply explained 
the gross licensing income with the number of licenses generating income. Furthermore, he did not 
apply diagnostic tests other then checking R-square and individual t-tests for the variables in his 
regressions. 
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Trune and Goslin (1998) calculated the profitability of technology transfer programs of 
universities by using mainly the data from the AUTM 1995 survey and some other sources for 
university characteristics. They defined the profit from maintaining TTOs as the one third of licensing 
revenues (which is taken as the share of TTO) net of cost of maintaining TTOs (personnel and 
overhead costs). Based on this measure, they found that nearly 60% of the universities are earning 
negative profits from maintaining technology transfer offices. They further defined the profit from 
maintaining overall technology transfer programs as the two third of licensing revenues (as the sum of 
shares of TTO and inventor's department) net of cost of maintaining TTOs as previously defined and 
net cost of patenting (patent expenses less reimbursed legal fees). Based on this measure, they found 
that nearly half of the institutions obtained negative profit from overall technology transfer programs. 
They also attempted to measure the local communities' benefits by assuming that all the costs of 
technology transfer programs (except those paid to US patent and trademarks office), the research 
grants obtained from these activities and the inventors' share from license revenues are spent in the 
local community. They found that these institutions put $434 million on aggregate and $2.37 million 
on average to their local economies. However, these figures were calculated without any net benefit 
or opportunity cost considerations regarding these technology transfer programs. They also 
categorized the universities based on their differences and did all the previous calculations for each 
category and made comparisons. 
Siegel, Waldman and Link (2003) performed a productivity analysis of TTOs for 113 US 
universities by using stochastic frontier estimation (SFE) approach. Their focus was on technology 
transfer activities between universities and industry. They took the number of license agreements and 
license revenues as proxies for technology transfer activities and carried out separate estimations for 
each of them. The latter as a proxy can be problematic to begin with, because the goals of technology 
transfer and revenue generation are not necessarily tied together and may not be consistent with each 
other as pointed out earlier. They applied a knowledge production function approach, whereby 
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technology transfer is produced by the inputs of TTO (measured by the number of TTO staff), 
external lawyers (measured by external legal expenses), and faculty inputs (measured by the number 
of disclosures to TTO). Moreover, the deviations from the production frontier due to inefficiency 
were modeled to be a function of external/institutional and organizational factors. For the former, 
they considered the age of TTO, whether university has a medical school, whether it is a public and 
some other variables indicating local industry and state conditions, which are outside of control of 
TTOs. They argued that organization factors are not systematically measurable nor are clearly 
identified in the literature. 
Even though their main data source (AUTM surveys) covered the time period between 1991 
and 1996, they used the annual averages of the variables over the sample period rather than 
constructing a panel. They argued that because some of the universities did not continuously respond 
to the survey during the survey period, it would be problematic to work with an unbalanced panel and 
wanted to keep as many universities as possible in the sample for the precision of production function 
estimation. They performed maximum likelihood estimation of the frontiers and found the 
coefficients of inputs to be significant, with signs as expected. Regarding the coefficients of variables 
of inefficiency equation (which models the deviations from production frontier due to inefficiencies), 
their signs were found to be as expected except for the mixed result for the sign of medical school 
dummy variable. Although the joint significance of the coefficients of the variables, which captured 
the inefficiency effects was confirmed, most of the coefficients individually turned out to be 
insignificant. They thought that omitted organizational variables, which are not measurable, caused 
this problem. Therefore they concluded that, in order to fully explain the deviations from the 
production frontier due to inefficiency, they needed to explore organizational practices. To this end, 
they interviewed the parties involved in technology transfer activities at five US universities on the 
nature of technology transfer process and reported their findings from these interviews. 
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Finally, Lach and Schankerman (2003) studied the question of whether the economic 
incentives provided to academic researchers in the licensing arrangements (in the form of royalty 
sharing rules) affected the number and commercial value of inventions generated in universities. 
Based on panel of 102 US universities for the period 1991-1999, they found that universities with 
higher royalty shares to inventors significantly generated higher license revenues although they 
appear to receive less number of disclosures to their technology transfer offices. The negative effect 
on the disclosures was attributed to the possibility that increased royalty shares encouraged inventors 
to disclose the inventions with higher commercial potential rather than reporting plenty of inventions 
with less commercial prospect. The effect on revenue generation was found to be much stronger in 
the sub sample of private universities compared to the sub sample of public universities. Moreover, 
the effect on the disclosures received disappeared and turned out to be positive in the former, whereas 
it remained negative in the latter. 
3. The Modeling Framework 
In order to analyze the licensing rents of universities, we use the following linear population model, 
y -  Po + Pix \+ •••+PK - \ X K - \  + U  ( I )  
where y denotes the dependent variable, xk  denote the explanatory variables, /?,• denotes 
coefficients to be estimated, and observable random scalars, u is the unobservable random term. The 
variables to be used in the model are as follows. 
Dependent variable: 
Licensing rent: In a given year, this is calculated as the total license revenue less the cost of 
patenting and licensing activities. The cost is measured as the sum of operating expenditures of TTOs 
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(salary expenses plus benefits to the employees and overhead cost)1 and net legal fees expenditures 
(legal fees expended less legal fees reimbursed).2 Then, it is averaged over the sample period 1998 to 
2002. Figure 3 presents the distribution of the licensing rent, which is ranked in descending order and 
Table 1 presents the top 20 universities in terms of licensing rent. 
Explanatory variables: 
Quality of the faculty: The quality of inventions obviously matters, which can be presumed to be 
positively associated with the quality of faculty. For the quality of faculty, we take the total number of 
citations per faculty in technological departments.3 This is in level and obtained from the National 
Survey of Graduate Faculty done in 1993 (Research-Doctorate Programs in the United States, 1995). 
The size of the university: This is measured by total research expenditures. The question of interest 
is whether the size of the university matters as we control for the quality of faculty. 
Whether the university has a medical school: Biomedical research has emerged as a productive 
field whose research output attracted the interest of industry, and this trend was present before the 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act (Mowery, Nelson, Sampat and Ziedonis, 2001). Hence, having a 
1 See the Appendix for detailed discussion of the procedure used to construct the operating cost of 
TTOs. 
2 Legal fees expended are the expenditures of an institution on external legal fees, which include 
prosecuting, maintenance and interference costs of patents and copyrights. They also include minor 
litigation costs. Legal fees reimbursed are the legal fees expenditures reimbursed to the institution by 
licensees (See, AUTM, 2002). 
3 Alternative indexes are "Scholarly quality of faculty (ratings) in technological departments" and the 
"Number of publications per faculty in technological departments". Note that we normalize the 
citations received at each technological department by the number faculty in that department and sum 
over these departments in order to obtain total number of citations per faculty in technological 
departments in a given university. Lach and Shankerman (2003) further classifies these departments 
as six technological fields. The fields and the corresponding departments for each field stated within 
the brackets are Computer Science (Computer science), Chemical Science (Chemistry, Chemical 
Engineering), Engineering (Aerospace Engineering, Civil Engineering, Electrical Engineering, 
Industrial Engineering, Material Engineering, and Mechanical Engineering), Biomedical and 
Genetics (Biomedical Engineering, Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, Cell and Develop Biology, 
Molecular and General Genetics), Other Biological Sciences (Neurosciences, Pharmacology, 
Physiology, and Ecology, Evolution and Behavior), Physical Sciences (Astrophysics, Astronomy, 
Oceanography, Statistics and Biostatistics, Mathematics, Geology, Physics). 
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medical school is expected to provide a significant advantage in terms of generating rent from 
licensing activities. 
Given the available invention set, the input of TTO staff, by combining labor, skill, experience and 
expertise comes into the picture. Here, additional explanatory variables are: 
The age of the technology transfer office: This is proxy for the experience of TTO and calculated 
by 2002. 
Exclusivity of licenses and the size of licensees: In the sample period we cover, AUTM surveys 
provide detailed data on whether licenses are executed exclusively or non-exclusively and to start-up, 
small or large companies. That provides a rich set of variables such as the share of licenses executed 
exclusively, the share of licenses executed to small companies, etc. Recall that one of the aims of the 
Bayh-Dole Act was to encourage licensing to small and/or start-up companies and the main 
presumption of the Act was that exclusive licensing is often necessary as an incentive to develop 
university inventions that requires significant amount of fixed investment. 
Whether university is public or private: As public universities are more vulnerable to budget crises 
(Link, Scott, and Siegel, 2003), they may license more aggressively. On the other hand, public 
universities may culturally and bureaucratically be less flexible in interacting with private companies 
(Siegel, Waldman, and Link, 2003), therefore, ceteris paribus, they may have a lower licensing rate. 
State R&D intensity: The performance of TTO office will also depend on the location of the 
universities and the local conditions that are mostly out of university's control. Here, we take the 
share of state-level R&D within national R&D performance in order to measure ongoing R&D 
activity in that state. This is also averaged over the sample period 1998 to 2002. Table 2 presents the 
R&D intensity for top 20 universities' states, where a systematic relationship between the rank of 
universities in licensing rent and state R&D intensity is not apparent. 
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One may argue that the current shocks to the license rent equation can potentially affect some 
of the explanatory variables such as the quality of faculty, size of the university in terms of total 
research expenditures, the share contracts that are licensed exclusively to large companies in the 
future. Then, the covariance between these explanatory variables and the disturbance term may not be 
zero, which violates Assumption 1 .a. In such a case, OLS estimators would lose the consistency 
property. For the quality variable, it is based on citations measured in 1993; therefore, can be assumed 
as exogenous for the sample period we covered, which is 1998 to 2002. For other variables, because 
we work with the averages of these variables over the sample period, these potential effects (if any) 
may be mitigated. 
One might also be concerned about the possible effects of some university specific 
organizational variables on the explanatory variables. These can be culture and bureaucracy, and the 
resolution of possibly multiple objectives among the parties (university scientist, administration, TTO 
staff, outside companies) to the technology transfer activities within a given university as these parties 
have different opinions regarding these activities (Thursby, Jensen, and Thursby, 2001 and Siegel, 
Waldman, and Link, 2003). However, these organizational effects are not easily measurable, in fact 
there is no consensus over what to measure (Siegel, Waldman, and Link, 2003). The variables such as 
the age of the technology transfer office and whether university is public or private, will also capture 
the effects of these organizational variables to some extent.4 In the next section, we elaborate more on 
our data sources for the variables introduced here. 
4. Data 
The major source of data is AUTM (Association of the University Technology Managers) surveys, 
which provide annual data for the U.S. universities covering the period of 1991 to 2002. We focus on 
4 The royalty sharing policy of universities for licensing activities would be a better variable to reflect 
how the rights of parties to the technology transfer policy are balanced but we do not have available 
data. 
102 
the last five years from 1998 to 2002 as this is the only time period where some data on the operating 
cost of technology transfer offices are available. The number of U.S. universities responding to the 
AUTM survey was 156 in 2002, although they are not all recurrent respondents in this period. 
Pooling the observations over the five year time period 1998 to 2002 yields an initial sample of 180 
U.S. universities over this time period. Nevertheless, after adjusting for the missing observations on 
various variables, we are left with the final sample of 148 observations from U.S. universities that are 
used in the estimations. The survey includes various data on licensing activities of universities 
including the total research expenditures, the number of disclosures received, the number of new 
patent applications filed, the number of active licenses, the number of licenses executed by the 
universities, the number of licenses generating revenues, license revenues received, legal fees 
expended, and legal fees reimbursed. The surveys also have data on university characteristics such as 
the technology transfer program start date, and whether a university has a medical school, whether it 
is public or private, the location of the university, and the number of TTO staff. 
The other source for university characteristics, such as citations received per program faculty, 
number of faculty in a given program, scholarly quality of program faculty, etc. is the 1993 National 
Survey of Graduate Faculty (Research-Doctorate Programs in the United States, 1995). The main 
source for salary data is College and University Personnel Association (CUPA) administrative 
compensation surveys, which provide data for the two key positions in TTO for the period of 1998 to 
2002.5 Combining the employment data from AUTM surveys and salary data from CUP A surveys, 
we estimate the operating expenses of TTOs as discussed in detail in the first section of the Appendix. 
Finally, the data on state and national level R&D expenditures is obtained from the National Science 
Foundation's website.6 
5 See the webpage at http://www.cupahr.org about more information about this organization. 
6 See the website at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/sepro/start.htm for more information. 
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5. Estimation procedure 
Recall that the model to be estimated can be written as: 
y  = Po +  Pix \  + — + P K - \ X K - \  + U  ( 2 )  
where y,x l ,x2 , . . . . ,xK_1  are observable random scalars, u is the inobservable random disturbance 
term and /?0,are the parameters we would like to estimate. We make the following 
assumptions on the population moments: 
Assumption l.a. E(x 'u ) = 0 
Assumption 2.  rank E(x 'x)  =  K 
where £[.] is the expectation operator and x  is the KyA  vector of explanatory variables (which 
includes the intercept). Assumption 1 means E(u) = 0 because the intercept term is included in the 
vector x and the disturbance term u is uncorrected with the each of the regressors. Assumption 2 
means that the (population) variance matrix of the (K -1) x 1 non constant variables in x is non-
singular. Assumption 2 is a standard assumption and fails only if one of these variables can be written 
as exact linear combination of the others. 
One can assume a stronger assumption instead of Assumption 1 .a. 
Assumption l.b. E[u |x] = 0 
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which further ensures that the disturbance term u is uncorrected with any non-linear functions (such 
as  cross-products  or  power  funct ions)  of  the  {K -1)  x  1  non constant  var iables  in  x  .  
Provided with a random sample of N observations from the population, that is, 
|(y, ,x, ) : i -1,..., N} independently and identically distributed, where the subscript i indexes each 
observation, we can write equation (1) as 
y t  =  x [ p  +  u t  i  =  \ , . . . , N  (3) 
Under Assumptions l.a and 2, OLS using a random sample consistently estimates the parameters in 
equation (2). Under Assumption 1 .b. OLS estimates are unbiased, that is E[f3 \ X] - (3 if XX is non-
singular where X is NxK whose z'th row is xt and also unbiased unconditionally if £[/?] exists. 
We have a sample of U.S. universities over the five year period 1998 to 2002 and the data is 
aggregated at the university level. Even though some universities are recurrently observed during this 
time period, we do not perform panel data analysis but rather we compute the annual averages of the 
time varying variables (both dependent and explanatory variables) over the sample period. This 
approach is also adopted in Siegel, Waldman and Link (2003). The main reason for this modeling 
choice is to maximize the observation number to better rely on asymptotic results in the cross section 
dimension. Given that a license produces a stream of revenues over time, it is expected that the annual 
level of total returns will depend on the previous years' levels, and thus, any panel data analysis 
would need to take lags of the dependent variable into account, and modeling about the lag structure 
may require a longer stream of data than we have here. Moreover, introducing such a lag structure 
may lead to sample selection problems as non-recurrent respondents would be dropped from the 
regression. By working with the annual averages of the variables on the cross section dimension, we 
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can obtain the largest possible size of sample, which initially includes 180 U.S. universities. Finally, 
we assume that we have a random sample of outcomes for these universities. 
Even though Assumption 1 .b is stronger than Assumption 1 .a, it is not as strong as assuming 
that the disturbance term and the explanatory variables are independent, therefore, it still leaves the 
variance of the disturbance term conditioned on the regressors, denoted with V[u \ x], as unrestricted. 
Given the observed skewness in the licensing rent data, we can not assume that errors are normally 
distributed. Together with a fairly large sample of observations that we have here for cross-section of 
universities, there is no additional gain from making some form of homoskedasticity assumption for 
the disturbance term in equation (2). For inference, we rely on asymptotic results, which are obtained 
by increasing the sample size in the cross section dimension. For any possibility of heteroskedasticity, 
we use and report the heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.7 The Wald test statistics based on 
these standard errors are asymptotically distributed j2 with the appropriate degrees of freedom 
depending on the number of restrictions tested (Wooldridge, 2002) and the reported p-values below 
are from this distribution. 
6. Results 
We present the OLS estimation results for various models (Models 1 to 7) in Table 6. For the 
descriptions of variables' names in these models, and the summary statistics for the variables used in 
the estimations, we refer the reader to Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Table 5 also presents the 
correlations among the variables. In the following, we discuss the results for the models in Table 6. In 
conclusion, we take Model 3 as the base model. 
We start with Model 1 in Table 6, where we include all the explanatory variables except FL 
dummy we consider in Table 3. The model explains the 30% of the variation in licensing rent. The 
university specific variables (quality, size, med, and private) are positively related with the licensing 
7 The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are obtained by a SAS procedure. 
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rent as expected. The variable quality stands out among these variables with a p-value of 14%. The 
contract variables (exclusive, small, and start-up) are negatively related with the licensing rent. The 
other TTO variable age has a negative sign. All explanatory variables except exclusive are 
insignificant at the 10% level. 
Given the performance of Model 1, we suspect that Florida State University is an outlier 
among the big winner universities compared to its characteristics. Other than the fact that it has 
medical school, it is a public university with relatively low number of citations per faculty (246), total 
research expenditures ($135,800,000) slightly higher than median level and a relatively recent TTO (7 
years of experience), etc (see also Table 4 for the comparison). We separate this observation by 
introducing a dummy variable, FL dummy, which takes the value of one for the Florida State 
University and zero otherwise. We add this dummy variable to the variables in Model 1 and obtain 
Model 2. The dummy variable turns out to be significant at the 0.1 percent level and its coefficient 
yields nearly the licensing rent for this university. The fitting performance of the new model is better 
as the R2 and R2 significantly increase to 44% and 39%, respectively. The economic impact of 
medical school dummy is now lower, whereas that of private university dummy is higher. The 
coefficients of other variables are slightly affected with the introduction of the dummy. Because 
separating the observation for Florida State University appears to be useful in terms of predictions of 
the model for other universities, we continue to do so in the rest of our analysis. 
From Model 2, we observe that the variables age and stateR&D are highly insignificant with 
p-values of 87% and 52%, respectively. We drop these variables and obtain Model 3. The magnitudes 
of coefficients and significance of the remaining variables are slightly affected and R2 are slightly 
higher. Particularly, the quality variable is now significant at the 10% level and the variable exclusive 
is border line case at the same level. Although other variables are not significant at the standard 
levels, they are not too insignificant, either. The signs of their coefficients are as expected and they 
provide important economic information so we prefer to include them. Therefore, we take Model 3 as 
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the base model. Nevertheless, Models 4, 5 and 6 show the possible effects of excluding these 
variables. In Model 4 the variables, med and private are further excluded from Model 3. Model 5 is 
obtained by excluding the contract variables {exclusive, small, and start-up) from Model 3. In Model 
6, both groups of variables are excluded from Model 3. Note that one fails to reject these restrictions 
in Model 3 at the standard levels of significance.8 Nevertheless, R2 and R2 s among these models 
are very close, therefore, we choose the most informative one, which is Model 3. Furthermore, Model 
7 is presented to demonstrate the impact of the quality variable by leaving this variable out from 
Model 2. The variables med, private, age, exclusive, and stateR&D become either significant or have 
p-values that are around the 10% level. Particularly, the variable size is significant at the 0.01% level. 
In essence, the quality variable replaces the effects of these variables in Model 2. 
In the base model (Model 3), R2 and R2 are 43% and 40%, respectively. The impact of a 
single citation received on the licensing rent is $7,666. The coefficient of the variable size can be 
interpreted as the "rate of return" from total research expenditures and slightly exceeds 1 cent for 
each dollar of research expenditures. The variables med and private show that private universities and 
the universities with medical school have additional advantage in generating license rent (around $1 
Million and $1.5 Million, respectively) albeit these effects are statistically insignificant at the standard 
levels due to co-presence of the variables, quality and size. The contract variables {exclusive, small, 
and start-up) are still negatively related with the licensing rent. Particularly, increasing the share of 
total licenses that are licensed exclusively 1 percentage point decreases the licensing rent nearly 
$48,318. The other contract variables also have similar impacts and can be similarly interpreted 
although they are less statistically significant. 
8 For the tests, the Wald test statistics which is distributed as j2 with the appropriate degrees of 
freedom {d.f, ) and the associated p-values (denoted with p ) are calculated as follows: j2 = 2.35 , 
d.f. -2, p = 0.31 for the restrictions in Model 3 yielding Model 4, %2 = 2.67, d.f. = 3 , p = 0.45 
for the restrictions in Model 3 yielding Model 5, and %2 = 4.23, d.f. - 5 , p = 0.52 for the 
restrictions in Model 3 yielding Model 6. 
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Figure 4 presents the standardized residuals from Model 3, which are sorted by the ranked 
licensing rent. Except for the Columbia University and University of California System, the values of 
standardized residuals remain less than the rule of thumb value of 3. For the University of California 
System, the standardized residual value constitutes a border line case. Note that this university is the 
third in generating licensing rent. For the Columbia University, the standardized residual value is 
close to 10, however, this university is top ranked in terms of licensing rent and constitutes a rather 
extreme case. We did not expect much to explain the universities with extreme rents per se. The 
objective here is rather to use the information they provide to explain the expected value of license 
rents for other universities in the population. Hence, we find the performance of Model 3 in terms of 
values of the standardized residuals as satisfactory. Figure 5 also presents the predicted values for 
licensing rent together with the actual values based on Model 3. 
Because we asked the question of what universities can expect in terms of rent generation 
from the licensing activities, we carry out a mean analysis of the predictions of licensing rent from 
Model 3 for various categories of the population and present the results in Table 7. We also provide a 
mean analysis of the explanatory variables in the same table. 
The expected licensing rent is nearly $4.5 Million in the population, which is nearly the 2.5 
percent of the average size of universities in terms of total research expenditures. The number of 
universities predicted with non-negative economic rent is 102, which is nearly 70% of the population. 
Private universities are obtaining economic rent nearly three times more than public universities. 
Having a medical school makes a difference as these universities are earning nearly five times more 
than those without medical school. Furthermore, given the status of universities in terms of medical 
school presence, the mean value of predicted licensing rents for private universities is higher 
compared to the public universities. Moreover, the mean value of predicted licensing rents for 
universities without medical school is lower than the one for universities with medical school given 
the type (private or public) of universities. 
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These findings are consistent with the performances of universities in terms of quality and 
size. From Table 7, the difference between the mean levels of citations per faculty (the measure of 
quality of faculty) across private and public universities that have the same status in terms of medical 
school presence is apparent as it is much higher for the former. For public universities, the medical 
school presence makes difference as higher mean level of citations. For private universities, those 
with medical school have higher mean size than those without medical school and the former has also 
a slightly higher mean citation value than the latter. 
7. Conclusion 
We have done an econometric analysis of economic rents of U.S. universities from patenting and 
licensing activities, which dramatically surged in the last two decades. The data is mainly from 
AUTM surveys on various aspects of licensing activities and some other sources on the 
characteristics of the universities. We also incorporate some salary data from CUPA surveys in order 
to estimate operating cost of TTOs. The data covers a cross section of 148 U.S. universities and is 
averaged over the five year period from 1998 to 2002. We consistently estimate a structural equation 
of licensing rent on various explanatory variables by the ordinary least squares procedure. We rely on 
asymptotic results in the cross section dimension for inference and use the heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. 
We wanted to answer the question of what US universities can expect in terms of economic 
rent from licensing activities as the rent generation motive is one of the concerns raised in this 
context. We obtain that the expected licensing rent in the population corresponds to nearly 2.5% of 
the average size of universities in terms of research expenditures. Moreover, from Table 6, the 
coefficient of the variable size is estimated around 1,000 across models. Given the units of 
measurement, this means that the "rate of return" to R&D funds is about 1%. Finally, nearly 70% of 
the universities are predicted to obtain non-negative economic rent from these activities. 
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We identify the quality of faculty (which is measured by the citations per faculty received in 
technology departments) and (to a lesser extend) the size of the university in terms of total research 
expenditures as the main sources of advantage in generating licensing rent. Controlling these factors, 
the private universities and the universities with medical school seem to have additional advantage in 
terms of generating licensing rent; however these effects are not statistically significant at the 
standard levels. Moreover, TTO experience is found to be neither economically important nor 
statistically significant. Nevertheless, it appears that exclusive contracts and contracts licensed to 
small or start-up companies are paying off negatively in the population, which are the type of licenses 
that Bayh-Dole Act aimed to encourage. Finally, state level R&D intensity does not seem to be an 
important factor, either. Therefore, our results may suggest that universities can give priority in 
investing to high quality faculty and appropriating research funds in technology departments in order 
to be successful in generating license rent. 
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Table 1: Top 20 Universities in terms of Licensing Rent 
Universities License Renta 
Columbia University $109,586,843 
Florida State University $56,499,619 
University of California System b $53,963,400 
Yale University $35,264,382 
Stanford University $34,879,008 
New York University $30,461,976 
Massachusetts Inst, of Technology (MIT) $26,966,214 
Michigan State University $25,305,529 
University of Florida $22,591,317 
University of Washington $21,917,569 
University of Wisconsin Madison $17,771,161 
University of Rochester $17,306,887 
Dartmouth College $13,803,977 
State University of New York $12,039,576 
Emory University $11,545,344 
University of Minnesota $11,199,555 
University of Massachusetts $11,037,850 
Harvard University $10,745,855 
University of Pennsylvania $8,942,236 
California Institute of Technology $8,844,954 
a Averaged over the time period 1998-2002 
b Excluding one time settlement revenue ($200 Million) of UC system for its human growth 
invention in 2000, which would place UC system as the second. 
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Table 2: State R&D intensity for top 20 Universities 
Universities State State 
R&D Share 
Columbia University New York 5.81% 
Florida State University Florida 2.03% 
University of California System California 20.94% 
Yale University Connecticut 2.05% 
Stanford University California 20.94% 
New York University New York 5.81% 
Massachusetts Inst, of Technology (MIT) Massachusetts 5.60% 
Michigan State University Michigan 7.02% 
University of Florida Florida 2.03% 
University of Washington Washington 3.99% 
University of Wisconsin Madison Wisconsin 1.19% 
University of Rochester New York 5.81% 
Dartmouth College New Hampshire 0.51% 
State University of New York New York 5.81% 
Emory University Georgia 1.28% 
University of Minnesota Minnesota 1.82% 
University of Massachusetts Massachusetts 5.60% 
Harvard University Massachusetts 5.60% 
University of Pennsylvania Pennsylvania 4.13% 
California Institute of Technology California 20.94% 
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Table 3: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
7 rent Licensing rent in a given university. (Averaged over the 
sample period 1998 to 2002 and in dollars ) 
*1 quality Total number of citations received per faculty in 
technology departments in a given university. This is in 
level and measured in 1993. 
x2 size The average total research expenditures (in hundred 
thousands) over the sample period 1998 to 2002. 
*3 med Dummy variable: 1 if university has medical school 0 
otherwise. 
x4 private Dummy variable: 1 if university is private and 0 
otherwise. 
X5 age Age of technology transfer office (in years) of a given 
university by 2002. 
X6 exclusive The share total licenses which are executed exclusively 
(Averaged over the sample period 1998 to 2002). 
x7 small The share total licenses which are executed to small 
companies (Averaged over the sample period 1998 to 
2002). 
x8 startup The share total licenses which are executed to start-up 
companies (Averaged over the sample period 1998 to 
2002). 
x9 stateR&D The ratio of total R&D performance level in a given 
state to the national R&D performance level (Averaged 
over the sample period 1998 to 2002). 
X10 FL dummy Dummy variable for the Florida State University, which 
takes the value of one for this university and zero 
otherwise. 
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Variables 
Variable Na Mean Std. Dev. Min 25th 
Pctlb 
Median 75th 
Pctl 
Max Sum 
rent0 148 4,419,394 12,533,412 -804,724 -138,847 305,683 2,502,656 109,586,843 654,070,357 
quality 148 485 519 1 152 318 643 2,691 71,833 
sizeà 148 1,837 2,247 97 558 1,169 2,384 20,792 271,877 
med 148 0.622 0.487 0 0 1 1 1 92 
private 148 0.297 0.459 0 0 0 1 1 44 
age 148 16.3 11.4 1 9 15 19 78 2413 
exclusive 148 0.66 0.22 0.09 0.49 0.67 0.83 1.00 97.56 
small 148 0.48 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.50 0.57 1.00 71.53 
start-up 148 0.18 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.15 0.25 0.63 27.13 
stateR&D 148 0.031 0.036 0.0003 0.0082 0.0209 0.0512 0.2094 4.6607 
a Number of Observations; 
b Percentile 
0 Excluding one time settlement revenue (200 Million $) of UC system related to its human growth hormone invention in 2000. 
d In hundred thousands. 
Table 5: Pearson Correlation Coefficients3 
rent quality size med private age exclusive small start-up stateR&D 
rent 1.000 0.513 0.448 0.202 0.199 0.215 -0.29 -0.07 -0.09 0.322 
quality 1.000 0.682 0.249 0.371 0.462 -0.37 -0.06 -0.10 0.546 
size 1.000 0.231 0.066 0.378 -0.28 0.06 -0.13 0.458 
med 1.000 0.172 0.033 -0.10 0.07 -0.09 0.106 
private 1.000 0.117 -0.14 -0.11 -0.03 0.280 
age 1.000 -0.23 0.06 -0.14 0.157 
exclusive 1.00 0.04 0.33 -0.17 
small 1.00 -0.49 0.05 
start-up 1.00 -0.03 
stateR&D 1.00 
" Number of observations are 148 for all variables. 
Table 6: OLS Results: (Dependent Variable: rent ; N=148)a 
Expl. Varbls Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
intercept $4,394,964 
(5,399,196) 
0.416 
$4,841,673 
(5,394,052) 
0.369 
$4,583,045 
(4,987,075) 
0.358 
$5,440,550 
5,366,414 
0.311 
-53,239,839 
1,084,707 
0.003 
-$2,531,387 
(918,249) 
0.0058 
$6,495,566 
(6,467,274) 
0.315 
quality $7,323 
(4,981) 
0.142 
$7,262 
(4,969) 
0.144 
$7,666 
(4,317) 
0.076 
$8,662 
4,428 
0.051 
$8,725 
4,972 
0.079 
$9,826 
(5,166) 
0.0571 
size $1,043 
(859) 
0.225 
$1,058 
(868) 
0.223 
$1,114 
(950) 
0.241 
$1,024 
927 
0.270 
$1,093 
951 
0.251 
$984 
(938) 
0.2941 
$1,792 
(486) 
0.000 
med $1,709,408 
(1,122,806) 
0.128 
$993,913 
(885,052) 
0.261 
$929,676 
(902,091) 
0.303 
$819,825 
862,727 
0.342 
$1,563,912 
(1,035,513) 
0.131 
private $841,298 
(1,488,019) 
0.572 
$1,352,546 
(1,402,110) 
0.335 
$1,580,170 
(1,335,517) 
0.237 
$1,796,721 
1,428,922 
0.209 
$3,122,192 
(1,954,561) 
0.110 
age -$34,650 
(66,307) 
0.601 
-$9,750 
(59,655) 
0.870 
$59,876 
(35,786) 
0.094 
exclusive -$5,299,445 
(3,073,174) 
0.085 
-$4,923,180 
(3,049,916) 
0.107 
-$4,868,054 
(2,997,969) 
0.104 
-$4,831,812 
3,010,417 
0.109 
-$7,005,682 
(4,215,904) 
0.097 
small -$5,452,460 
(6,183,001) 
0.378 
-$7,199,127 
(5,982,590) 
0.229 
-$6,743,755 
(6,256,258) 
0.281 
-$6,903,048 
6,307,239 
0.274 
-$9,033,004 
(7,047,006) 
0.200 
start-up -$3,179,954 
(5,748,311) 
0.580 
-$5,354,923 
(5,410,534) 
0.322 
-$4,851,219 
(5,447,470) 
0.373 
-$5,257,415 
5,568,096 
0.345 
-$5,257,917 
(5,566,057) 
0.345 
State 
R&D 
$16,429,141 
(27,882,300) 
0.556 
$18,309,152 
(28,132,955) 
0.515 
$42,050,501 
(27,747,701) 
0.130 
FL dummy $55,979,509 
(817,398) 
<.0001 
$56,016,128 
(950,143) 
<.0001 
$56,124,058 
955,834 
<0001 
$55,289,521 
646,750 
<0001 
$55,277,105 
(461,923) 
<0001 
$56,086,016 
(874,926) 
<0001 
SSR 
1.610E+16 1.304E+16 1.309E+16 1.32E+16 1.35E+16 1.36E+16 1.373E+16 
R 2 ( R 2 )  0.30 (0.26) 0.44(0.39) 0.43 (0.40) 0.43 (0.41) 0.42 (0.40) 0.41 (0.40) 0.41 (0.37) 
1 Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in brackets. The probability values (p-values) for the estimates are from Chi-square distribution and 
eported under the standard errors. 
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Table 7: Mean Analysis 
Predicted 
licensing rentb 
Quality 
of the faculty 
Size 
of the universityc 
U.S. universities Na Mean Mean Mean 
All 148 $4,419,394 485 1,837 
With medical school 92 $6,384,831 586 2,240 
Without medical school 56 $1,190,463 320 1,175 
Private 44 $8,236,571 780 2,064 
Public 104 $2,804,435 361 1,741 
Private with medical school 33 $9,051,632 794 2,261 
Public with medical school 59 $4,893,231 469 2,228 
Private without medical school 11 $5,791,389 740 1,474 
Public without medical school 45 $65,792 218 1,102 
a Number of Observations 
b Based on Model 3 in Table 6 
c In hundred thousands. 
Figure 1: Net Licensing Revenue 
(Averaged over the time period 1998 to 2002) 
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Figure 2: Net Licensing Revenue Normalized by Total Research Expenditures 
(Averaged over the time period 1998 to 2002) 
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Figure 3: Ranked Licensing Rent 
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Figure 4: Standardized Residuals 
(Based on Model 3 in Table 6 and Sorted by the Ranked Licensing Rent) 
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Figure 5: Predicted Licensing Rent (LR) 
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9. Appendix 
9.1. The operating cost of technology transfer offices (TTOs) 
We want to estimate the operating cost of TTOs, which includes salary expenses and benefits for 
TTO staff and overhead. We have data on the employment, which comes from AUTM surveys and 
partial data on the salaries, which are from College and University Professional Association (CUPA) 
administrative compensation surveys. Below, we discuss our procedure to estimate the operating cost 
of TTOs and compare our calculations with real figures for a sample of universities. 
AUTM surveys report the number of licensing and other full-time equivalents (PTEs) 
employed in the TTOs for the time period 1998 to 2002. Licensing PTEs typically include the 
licensing manager (also called associate director or program director) and senior and/or regular 
licensing associates (also called program coordinators). The other PTEs include the executive director 
of the TTO and other administrative and support personnel. 
College and University Professional Association (CUPA) administrative compensation 
surveys provide data for the salaries of two key positions in the TTOs, Chief Technology Transfer 
Officer (CTTO) and Senior Technology Licensing Officer (STLO) over the sample period 1998 to 
2002. We present the original data in Tables A.5 through A.9. Based on definitions provided for these 
positions in CUP A surveys, we think that CTTO and STLO correspond to the executive director and 
licensing manager, respectively in a typical TTO staff. 1 Regarding the salaries of remaining TTO 
staff, based on informal surveys, Major (1996) has some preliminary estimates for licensing 
associates. Regarding the benefits for TTO staff and salaries of support personnel and overhead 
expenses, Trune and Goslin (1996) assumes some numbers. We think that combining this limited 
information with the annual data from CUP A surveys is not meaningful. Because the salaries of top 
management in TTO and the remaining personnel are expected to be correlated, we rather prefer to 
1 The following definitions are provided in CUP A surveys for these positions: Chief Technology 
Transfer Officer: Senior administrative official responsible for managing technology transfer 
activities relating to scientific discoveries and inventions. Participates in the setting and interpretation 
of policy pertaining to these activities and supervises the licensing and administrative staff engaged in 
them. Has the budgetary authority for the activities. Communicates information about the activities to 
the institution's senior administration or governing board. Senior Technology Licensing Officer: 
Senior administrative official responsible for managing licensing projects and cases, including 
identifying and evaluating technologies with commercial potential and licensees for the technologies. 
Prepares invention summaries for marketing purposes and develops and implements marketing 
strategies for each technology. Drafts and negotiates licenses and other types of agreements, including 
material transfer, collaboration, and nondisclosure agreements. 
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use available data for the former in CUPA surveys to obtain estimates for the latter as follows: Based 
on the itemized expenses for TTO accounts of the Iowa State University and University of Minnesota, 
we make the following assumptions: For the salary of remaining licensing staff (typically senior 
and/or regular licensing associates), we take one half of the CTTO 's salary on average. For the salary 
of support staff (typically senior and/or regular accountant, secretary, etc), we take one third of the 
CTTO's salary on average. Moreover, we take 30% and 25% of total salary expenses for the 
employee benefits and overhead expenses, respectively on average. 
CUPA surveys provide data on median salaries for all doctorate universities of a given 
sample and also for the sub samples of these universities based on budget quartiles. For the latter, the 
sample of universities in a given year are ranked in terms of their operational budgets from low to 
high and one quarter of universities are included in each quartile. Then, median salary for each 
quartile is reported. One can find the budget ranges for each quartile in Tables 20 to 24 depending on 
the year. We would like to use the median salaries specific to budget quartiles rather than the ones for 
the entire sample in order to better approximate the operating expenses of TTOs for individual 
universities. However, we can not assign the median salaries above to universities based on their 
operational budgets because the data on operational budgets are not available for all universities 
during the time period that we are interested in. Particularly, CUPA Surveys do not report the budget 
figures for the individual universities within their samples. Nevertheless, AUTM surveys report the 
total research expenditures of universities. Because the total research expenditures and operational 
budget expenditures can be presumed to be positively correlated, (which should be especially true for 
the sample of doctorate universities in CUPA surveys), we assign the median salaries to universities 
based on their total research expenditures. 
In a given year, we rank the sample of universities in AUTM survey in terms of their total 
research expenditures from low to high and then find the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles, which form 
the basis for the quartile ranges.2 Then, we assign the median salaries for each quartile from CUPA 
surveys.3 This is equivalent to the assumption that a particular university belongs to the same quartile 
in terms of operational budgets and total research expenditures. We checked that this assumption is 
valid for a large number of universities in the sample and present Iowa State University (ISU) and 
2 For example, the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles turn out to be approximately $53 Million, $127 
Million and $285 Million, respectively in year 2002. Then, the first quartile of universities includes 
those universities with total research expenditures approximately less than $53 Million, and the 
second quartile includes those universities with total research expenditures that are approximately 
between $53 Million and $127 Million. The remaining quartiles are similarly defined. 
3 Note that the overwhelming majority of the universities in our sample are doctorate institutions. 
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University of Maryland at College Park as examples in Table A.l. However, for a few border cases 
such as North Carolina State University and University of Akron presented in the same table, we may 
end up using the median figures from immediately adjacent quartile. 
To sum up, the operating cost of a TTO in a given university i which belongs to quartile j 
where j = 1,2,3,4 in terms of total research expenditures (and in terms of operational budget, too by 
assumption) in a given year t where t -1998,1999,2000,2001,2002 and employs n> 1 licensing 
PTEs and m > 1 other PTEs is 
Cit — TSit + Bit + Hit (A.l) 
where TSit denotes the total salary expense and Bit denotes the benefits for TTO staff and 
HIT denotes the overhead expense, which are assumed to be related as 
Bit =0.3*75;., (A.2) 
H I T  =0 .25  *TS I T  (A.3) 
Total salary expense for TTO staff has two components 
75„=&%,+CK„ (A.4) 
where LSit denotes the salary expense for licensing PTEs and OSit denotes the salary expense for 
other PTEs in TTO, which are in turn calculated as 
+(" - 1)*(W4 (A 5) 
+(m-l)*(^,/3) (A.6) 
where 51, and S2 jt denotes the salary of CTTO and STLO, respectively for quartile j in a given 
year t  from CUPA surveys. Note that when n - 1 and/orm ~ l ,  we assume that TTO employs the 
corresponding top management only. 
Note that for the case of the University of California (UC) System, which includes 9 
campuses and the office of the president, AUTM surveys report the employment figures for the entire 
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system rather than individual campuses. For this exceptional case, calculations are done by assigning 
top management to each campus and the office of the president, that is, the formulas in (A.5) and 
(A.6) become 
where «>10 and m > 10 as one can verify from column 4 in Table A. 3. 
We compare our estimates with the actual numbers for the University of Minnesota, University of 
California (UC) System and Iowa State University (ISU) in Tables A.2 to A.4, respectively: 
One can verify from Table A.2 that estimated numbers for University of Minnesota are pretty 
close to the actual ones. Given the exceptional size of the TTO in the UC system, the estimated 
numbers could come close only so much (see Table A.3). Regarding the ISU, there is a apparent 
discrepancy between the actual and the estimated numbers (compare columns 3 and 5 in Table A.4), 
which is in fact due to the variety of reasons: First, the number of employees with TTO under the ISU 
Budget book (which is also the basis for the Annual Report of Iowa State University Research 
Foundation, Inc. (ISURF)) and AUTM surveys are different (compare columns 2 and 4 in Table A.4). 
Furthermore, the base salaries for some employers are much higher than the department salaries in the 
Budget Book, and it is the latter that is taken into account in the calculations of the Annual Report 
and the Budget Book. Moreover, from Table A.2 in year 2000, University of Minnesota has 13 FTEs 
employed in its TTO, which is 1 FTE less than ISU from column 4 in Table A.4, whereas the actual 
cost for TTO of ISU is dramatically lower. However, the estimates for the operating expenses of 
TTOs of both universities at that year are pretty close, which is consistent with the similar sizes of 
both TTOs. The bottom line is once the employment figures reported in AUTM surveys and the base 
salaries reported in the Budget Book are taken into account, the estimated numbers for the TTO of 
ISU are reasonable. 
From Tables A.2 to A.4, one can also observe that the estimated total cost for TTOs is 
monotonie in the size of TTO employment reported in AUTM surveys, therefore, it reflects the 
operating expenses of TTOs qualitatively well. 
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Table A.l 
Quartiles 
Fiscal Year 2002 
Universities Total Total Research Quartile in terms Quartile in terms 
Operational Expenditures b of budgets c of total research 
Budgeta expenditures d 
Iowa State Univ.e $695,792,000 $212,100,000 3 3 
Univ. of Maryland $938,145,312 $352,378,665 4 4 
at College Parkf 
North Carolina $725,588,000 $478,613,713 3 4 
State Universityg 
The Univ. of $269,997,782 $17,853,485 2 V 
Akron h 
a CUPA Surveys roughly define budget as total institutional budget including research funds, student aid, 
and auxiliary enterprises but excluding capital funds. Based on this definition, we exclude the expense 
item, Operations and Maintenance of Plant from operational budget figures of individual universities 
presented in this table. 
b Source: AUTM Survey Fiscal Year 2002 
c These quartiles ranges are based on CUPA surveys. See Table 9 for year 2002. 
d See footnote 9 for the quartile ranges. 
e Office of Controller. 
f Source: Department of Budget and Fiscal Analysis. 
8 North Carolina State University Annual Financial Report 2002. 
h Annual Financial Report 2002. 
1 The data for the first quartile is not available for this year in Table 24. We used the data from the second 
quartile as it is better approximation than the median figure for the entire sample, which turns out to be 
the right number based on budget figures. 
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Table A.2 
Operating Expenses for TTO of University of Minnesota 
Fiscal 
Year 
Actual Operating Expensesa Estimated 
Operating 
Expenses 
Total number of PTEs 
reported to AUTM 
Survey 
2000 $1,137,813 $1,147,240 13 
2001 $1,463,561 $1,630,376 18 
2002 $1,711,215 $2,069,411 23 
a Excluding the expense item consultant/purchased person, which is a sizable component of the total 
operating cost of the TTO in the University of Minnesota. 
Table A 3 
Operating Expenses for TTO of University of California System 
Fiscal Year Actual Operating Estimated Operating Total number of 
Expenses Expenses FTEsa 
1998 $7,913,000 $7,761,309 97 =38+59 
1999 $8,476,000 $7,697,755 92 =35+57 
2000 $9,677,000 $9,056,158 105=41+64 
2001 $10,832,000 $10,008,097 110=45+65 
2002 $12,135,000 $13,277,207 140=62+78 
a Source: AUTM Surveys. (Licensing PTEs + Other PTEs, respectively) 
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Table A.4 
Operating Expenses for TTO of Iowa State University 
Year Total number of 
employees under 
TTO in the ISU 
Budget Book 
Actual operating 
cost 
reported 
Total number of 
PTEs reported to 
AUTM 
Estimated Total 
Cost 
1998 9 $362,970a 10.75 $818,881 
1999 10 $437,243a 14 $1,009,981 
2000 10 $537,796a 14 $1,102,531 
2001 10 $500,050" 13 $996,117 
2002 10 $541,029 b 14 $1,157,718 
a Source: Annual Reports for the years 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 Iowa State University Research 
Foundation, Inc. (ISURF) 
b Source: ISU Budget Book. Note that the Budget Book leaves out an expense item (administrative and 
other) reported in the Annual Report, which is around $50,000 in previous years. 
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Table A.5 
Salary Data 1998 
Position Median Salaries ($) Number of 
(1998-1999) observations 
All CTTO 100,874 40 
Doctorate 
Institutions 
STLO 63,314 24 
Doctorate CTTO NA1 
Institutions STLO NA 
with 
Operational 
Budgets 
(Million $) 
<179.5 
[179.5,324.3] CTTO 80,510 5 
STLO NA 
[324.3,594.9] CTTO 101,860 15 
STLO 69,940 9 
CTTO 108,528 17 
>594.9 
STLO 63,000 11 
Source: CUPA (1999); CTTO and STLO stand for Chief Technology Transfer Officer 
and Senior Technology Licensing Officer, respectively. 
132 
Table A.6 
Salary Data 1999 
Position Median Salaries ($) Number of 
(1999-2000) observations 
All CTTO 102,689 55 
Doctorate STLO 70,050 26 
Institutions 
Doctorate CTTO 69,533 6 
Institutions STLO 73,450 4 
with 
Operational 
Budgets 
(Million $) 
<178.7 
[178.7,325.3] CTTO 82,523 7 
STLO 2 
[325.3,661.7] CTTO 106,256 18 
STLO 76,047 8 
CTTO 112,258 24 
>661.7 
STLO 68,178 12 
Source: CUPA (2000); CTTO and STLO stand for Chief Technology Transfer Officer 
and Senior Technology Licensing Officer, respectively. 
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Table A.7 
Salary Data 2000 
Position Median Salaries ($) Number of 
(2000-2001) observations 
All CTTO 110,470 63 
Doctorate STLO 75,677 33 
Institutions 
Doctorate CTTO 70,700 7 
Institutions STLO 2 
with 
Operational 
Budgets 
(Million $) 
<184 
[184,337.7] 
CTTO 93,265 9 
STLO 82,000 5 
[337.7,705.6] CTTO 111,295 20 
STLO 85,276 9 
CTTO 118,395 26 
>705.6 
STLO 69,250 16 
Source: CUPA (2001); CTTO and STLO stand for Chief Technology Transfer Officer 
and Senior Technology Licensing Officer, respectively. 
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Table A.8 
Salary Data 2001 
Position Median Salaries Number of observations 
(2001-2002) 
All CTTO 114,281 59 
Doctorate STLO 79,258 36 
Institutions 
Doctorate CTTO 70,700 5 
Institutions STLO NA 
with 
Operational 
Budgets 
(Million $) 
3187 
[187,353] 
CTTO 98,133 8 
STLO 66,550 5 
[353,689.5] 
CTTO 104,910 17 
STLO 83,136 14 
CTTO 124,976 29 
:> 689.5 
STLO 72,877 17 
Source: CUPA (2002); CTTO and STLO stand for Chief Technology Transfer Officer 
and Senior Technology Licensing Officer, respectively. 
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Table A.9 
Salary Data 2002 
Position Median Salaries ($) Number of observations 
(2002-2003) 
All CTTO 126,072 66 
Doctorate STLO 83,954 42 
Institutions 
Doctorate CTTO NA1 
Institutions STLO NA 
with 
Operational 
Budgets 
(Million $) 
<192.9 
[192.9,385.5] CTTO 113,850 11 
STLO 62,205 6 
[385.5,743.9] CTTO 110,000 24 
STLO 86,915 16 
CTTO 131,700 31 
>743.9 
STLO 83,954 20 
1 Not available. Source: CUPA (2003). CTTO and STLO stand for Chief 
Technology Transfer Officer and Senior Technology Licensing Officer, 
respectively. 
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
1. Conclusion 
We have identified three specific problems in the economics of innovation and addressed each of 
them in separate essays in this thesis. Although the essays are self contained, they are inter-related as 
each one refers to various stages of the overall innovation process, which typically involves R&D 
stage, intellectual property (IP) choices, commercialization and market competition, adoption and 
diffusion stages. 
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) starts from the R&D stage of the innovation process as we revisit the 
problem of correlation choices in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987). We integrate the intellectual property 
choices stage into their framework by taking into account the fact that firms have the option of trade 
secrecy in addition to patents in protecting their inventions, and ask whether this would have any 
impact on firms' diversification efforts. Essay 2 (Chapter 3) refers to the adoption and diffusion 
stages of the innovation process as we look at the economic effects of the introduction of Genetically 
Modified (GM) food in the European Union (EU) agricultural and food system. The third essay refers 
to R&D, IP choices and commercialization stages. After the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, universities can 
more easily patent and license their inventions. The inventions can be licensed to companies for 
further development, which in turn pays off to the university typically in the form of royalties. We 
want to analyze the determinants of the licensing rent generated from these activities. 
We approach these three problems with different methodologies. Essay 1 is theoretical in 
nature and we use a game-theoretic modeling of firms' project and IP choices in an R&D race. In 
essay 2, we use a partial equilibrium modeling of European agro food sector. Then, we calibrate the 
model's parameters by using the available data in year 2000. Essay 3 is empirical in nature and based 
on econometric modeling, where we estimate a structural equation of licensing rents of universities. 
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Therefore, this thesis is methodologically diversified in analyzing the problems in the economics of 
innovation. 
These three essays also point out the role of government to influence the innovation process 
in various contexts. In essay 1, we obtain that government can induce the competitive diversification 
efforts of private firms in a market setting only when multiple IP instruments are present, particularly, 
by weakening the patent protection relative to trade secrecy protection, which can be obtained by 
decreasing the patent length or strengthening the trade secrecy protection, respectively. In essay 2, we 
study the economic implications of the EU's complex and (ongoing) regulation of authorized GM 
products, which aims to provide a choice to consumers between GM and non-GM products. The 
regulation implies significant economic costs because it requires labeling and traceability of GM 
content in all stages of production, and allows only a stringent adventitious presence of GM content in 
other products. We obtain that the labelling and traceability requirements of GM products, which 
discourage the production of GM food, further decrease aggregate welfare. 
In the third essay, the main impact of the government is through the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 
which allows U.S. universities and non-profit organizations to retain title to patents deriving from 
federally funded research. The main presumption of the Act was that exclusive licensing is often 
necessary as an incentive to develop university inventions that requires significant amount of fixed 
investment. Since the Act, U.S. universities are actively involved in technology transfer and licensing 
activities. This growth in university patenting and licensing activities has resulted in a considerable 
debate on how these activities have affected the traditional role of universities (advancement of 
science and dissemination of knowledge) and on whether the Bayh-Dole Act was in fact necessary to 
promote technology transfer. 
Finally, we finish up by reviewing main results from these three essays below. 
In Essay 1, we find that the availability of trade secrets in addition to patents can induce firms to 
diversify further at the equilibrium towards the social optimum. The reader is referred to Proposition 
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2 in Chapter 2 for this result. This is interesting because the correlation problem in a market setting 
can be overestimated if one considers a generic R&D race with an implicit single mode of protection, 
which is typically thought as patent. It also points out that market can come up with smart tools or 
institutional features in order to solve problems that are inherent in R&D races. 
In Essay 2, we find that the introduction of GM food in European agricultural and food system 
reduces the overall social welfare (both consumers and producers become worse off) but organic food 
producers may become better off. The reader is referred to Table 2 in Chapter 3 for this result. This 
conclusion differs from those of existing empirical studies, which have found a positive welfare 
impact of the new GM technology (e.g., Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson, 2000; Moschini, Lapan, 
and Sobolevsky, 2000; Demont and Tollens, 2004), but it is in keeping with the analyses of Lapan 
and Moschini (2004) and Fulton and Giannakas (2004). Those found positive welfare effects mainly 
did not take into account the segregation costs to provide non-GM goods and did not allow for 
differentiated consumer preferences over non-GM products. 
In Essay 3, we find that the main determinants of the licensing rents of U.S. universities as the 
quality of faculty (measured by the citations per faculty in technology departments) and to a lesser 
degree, the size of the university in terms of total research expenditures. The reader is suggested to 
compare Models 2 to 7 in Table 6 of Chapter 4 for this result. This is interesting because the quality 
variable is a good summary statistics for the various effects that would be usually thought of as 
critical such as the experience of TTO, state R&D intensity, medical school and private universities 
dummies by making them statistically insignificant at the standard levels once they are included 
together. This finding may suggest that universities can give priority in investing to high-quality 
faculty and appropriating research funds in technology departments in order to be successful in 
generating license rent. 
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